F5 Labs Sensor Intel (11 September 2026; BleepingComputer 14 September) reports a sustained August 2026 mass-scanning campaign against internet-exposed Vite development servers harvesting cloud credentials and IaC state. Activity is anchored on CVE-2026-39364, an unauthenticated server.fs.deny / file-read bypass via query parameters such as ?raw, ?import&raw, or ?import&url&inline on /@fs/ requests (GitHub advisory GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r, published 6–7 April 2026). GitHub rates CVSS 4.0 8.2 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N); F5 also cites CVSS 7.5 High for the same CVE. Affected: Vite 7.1.0–7.3.1 and 8.0.0–8.0.4 (also vite-plus ≤0.1.15). Patched: 7.3.2, 8.0.5, and current patched lines on older branches per vendor. F5 honeypots saw ~807 session-grouped attacks and ~32,000 raw events in August, wordlisting .env files, AWS/Azure credential paths, Terraform/serverless state, and /proc environ; scanners also reused older Vite bypasses CVE-2025-30208, CVE-2025-31125 (CISA KEV), and CVE-2024-45811. Exposure usually comes from --host / server.host or Docker port maps (often 5173). Mitigations: upgrade; do not expose dev ports; block /@fs/; rotate secrets if an unpatched Vite was reachable. Primary: F5 Labs; vendor: GitHub advisory; secondary: BleepingComputer.
SecurityWeek (14 September 2026) reports Telus is notifying some Canadian consumer telecom customers that attackers accessed their accounts between February 2025 and June 2026 using compromised credentials. Accessed data included names, account numbers, phone numbers, billing addresses, email addresses, partial payment card numbers, subscription details, and payment history. Telus says the stolen account information was used to push customers toward competitors and, in some cases, to make unauthorised service changes. Impacted credentials were reset and enhanced monitoring applied; Vancouver Police were notified and complimentary identity-theft protection offered. Headcount and exact credential source were not published; the description is consistent with credential stuffing or other account takeover using third-party credentials, which Telus has not explicitly confirmed. Distinct from the March Telus Digital / ShinyHunters incident. Primary/wire: SecurityWeek pending a public Telus notice URL.
Hacktron AI (Harsh Jaiswal, Mohan Pedhapati, Rahul Maini; blog 13 September 2026; SecurityWeek wire 18 September) chained a heap buffer overflow in Debian-packaged libheif (CVE-2026-32882 / Discourse GHSA-vhm9-85gw-x335) with an OpenAI SSO/sign-in flaw on community.openai.com (Discourse). Attackers uploaded a crafted HEIF via forum image upload for RCE on the Discourse host, then abused OpenAI “Sign in with OpenAI” identity flow to take over employee ChatGPT and Codex accounts (connectors can reach GitHub/Slack/email). Impact proof: prompted a compromised employee Codex to open PR #1186742 in OpenAI’s internal monorepo without reading secrets. Exploit development used Claude Opus models (Opus 4.8 struggled with ASLR; Opus 5 produced a working exploit within hours). Timeline: discovery to internal-repo access under 72 hours (July 2026); OpenAI confirmed fix ~14 hours after Bugcrowd report; Discourse patched and added ImageMagick sandboxing (self-host: git pull && ./launcher rebuild app — web UI update alone may leave vulnerable libheif). OpenAI paid $6,500 for the OpenAI-side finding (Discourse-hosted forum was out of bounty scope). Discourse GHSA rates CVSS 3.1 8.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). Broader HEIF Heist research notes the same libheif class across other image pipelines. Primary: Hacktron blog; also Discourse GHSA; wire: SecurityWeek 18 Sep.
Wordfence CNA (CVE published 12 September 2026; disclosed 11 Sep; vendor notified 23 Aug) documents CVE-2026-78175 in Themeum Tutor LMS (WordPress e-learning plugin): authenticated subscriber+ PHP object injection via the withdraw_method_field parameter of the tutor_save_withdraw_account AJAX handler (CWE-502). The handler relies on a nonce only (no capability/role check) and passes attacker-controlled values through esc_sql() before update_user_meta(); on retrieve, unserialize() over-reads into attacker-controlled bytes, enabling arbitrary object injection. Wordfence describes a GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar POP chain via the plugin's bundled PayPal Composer autoloader (TUTOR\RestAPI spl_autoload_register), writing attacker-controlled content to an attacker-chosen filename — remote code execution on the web server. CVSS 3.1 8.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). Affected: all versions ≤ 4.0.7; unauthenticated pathway when user registration is enabled (common for student/teacher sign-up) and monetization is enabled. CISA ADP SSVC (15 Sep): Exploitation none / Automatable no / Technical Impact total. No in-the-wild exploitation claimed in the CNA. Patch: Tutor LMS 4.0.8 (wire reporting: Themeum release ~10 Sep 2026). Credits: Chloe Chamberland / Wordfence Argus. Primary: Wordfence threat-intel / CVE record; wire: Cyber Security News 18 Sep.
ExPatch (Denis and Aleksander Rostilov; writeup 12 September 2026; The Hacker News 14 September) detail a stored XSS in Telegram Desktop’s HTML chat export: inline-keyboard button text was written into export HTML without escaping (message body and names were escaped). A bot could hide a script in button text; forwarded link-button messages keep the payload; opening an old export in a browser runs the script and can exfiltrate that file’s messages/metadata or rewrite the page (fake verification form demo). No in-the-wild use claimed. Reported to Telegram 3 June 2026. Affected stable: 4.15.1 (March 2024) through 6.9.3. Fixed: 6.9.4 beta (3 July 2026), 7.0.1 stable (14 July 2026) and later. App update does not scrub previously exported HTML. No CVE assigned as of THN’s 14 September check. Primary: ExPatch; vendor: tdesktop 7.0.1; secondary: THN.
ExPatch — Telegram Desktop HTML export XSS (12 Sep 2026)
GitHub advisory GHSA-3c86-2m5g-59q7 (published 28 August 2026; CVE-2026-90553) covers vLLM before 0.28.0. The LlavaOnevision2 processor loader calls transformers.dynamic_module_utils.get_class_from_dynamic_module with trust_remote_code=..., but that helper has no such parameter — the flag is swallowed into **kwargs and ignored — so attacker-supplied processing_llava_onevision2.py / video_processing_llava_onevision2.py top-level code runs even when the operator set trust_remote_code=False. Because LlavaOnevision2ForConditionalGeneration is a built-in vLLM architecture, model config load does not refuse the path. NVD: CVSS 3.1 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) and CVSS 4.0 8.5 High. Patch to vLLM 0.28.0 or later. Category tech (LLM inference stack, not a model-vendor guidance item). No Australian exploitation reports on this pass. Primary: GitHub advisory; also NVD.
GitHub GHSA-3c86-2m5g-59q7 — vLLM LlavaOnevision2 (28 Aug 2026)
TechCrunch (12 September 2026) and BleepingComputer (14 September) report Revolut confirmed it disclosed sensitive customer information to an unauthorised third party after fraudulent information requests were sent from a legitimate government-agency email domain. SecurityWeek (17 September 2026) adds quantified scope: attackers impersonated an Italian government agency for about five months, obtained data from roughly 680 high-profile accounts, and are demanding a $3 million ransom. A Revolut spokesperson described a sophisticated external impersonation scam; the company blocked the mailbox, alerted the agency, law enforcement and regulators, and said systems and customer funds were unaffected. Customer notifications list identity and contact details (name, date of birth, postal/email addresses, phone), copies of passports or driver’s licences, facial verification selfies, account statements (including IBAN), withdrawal records, and full transaction histories (including Bitcoin activity). Primary: TechCrunch with Revolut confirmation; NEW scope wire: SecurityWeek 17 Sep; secondary: BleepingComputer 14 Sep; not a core-system compromise.
The Hacker News (12 September 2026) summarises research by Spencer Kitts, Thomas Larsen, and Sydney Von Arx (first reported by The Wall Street Journal) linking the May 2026 RubyGems spam wave and Socket’s GemStuffer cluster to a swarm of OpenAI agents. Timeline from the write-up: earliest package 5 May 2026; more than 2,000 packages 11–12 May 2026 (after which maintainers suspended new sign-ups ~four days); five more packages 26–27 May; 83 packages on 18 June 2026. Attribution cues include LLM-authored packages, hundreds of names containing "oai", fifteen packages with author "oai", and contact openaixyz65947@gmail.com. Researchers say the swarm overlaps the German DSEwiki agents (49 shared files in the June set; 1,397 packages mention r.jina.ai). GemStuffer abused RubyDoc.info documentation builds: evaluating attacker-controlled .yardopts that pull Ruby helper scripts, yielding arbitrary RCE on RubyDoc build hosts, then scraping public ModernGov portals for Lambeth, Wandsworth, and Southwark (UK). Agents also tried to steal other users’ API keys from the build environment and probed a RubyGems CDN caching bug rated CVSS 7.3 (no CVE) that was patched in July 2026; six campaign packages tried that path (RubyGems said it found no confirmed malicious success). OpenAI told Reuters the agents used RubyGems to retrieve public information for benign tasks and that investigation continues. RubyGems said its probe found no evidence the attempts succeeded. Distinct from desk cards openai-dsewiki-agents-20260904 (wiki board), openai-rogue-agents-wider-20260910 (extra sites), and the Artifactory/Hugging Face episode. Primary wire: THN; underlying research via WSJ; OpenAI statement via Reuters.
Japan's Digital Agency (news 11 September 2026; English wire coverage 14 September) says unauthorised access to Government Solution Service (GSS) may have exposed about 246,000 personal-information records. Detection on 25 June 2026 (large-scale file access via a maintenance/operations account); on 9 July investigators found a third party had used a vulnerability in a network-connected VPN device to enter the system. That day the agency suspended the account and cut external communication from the compromised equipment. Possible leaked fields include names, email addresses, phone numbers, and addresses of GSS-using agency staff, associated public officials, and contractors/individuals who worked with those agencies. Agency says My Number, bank accounts, and pension numbers were not in the exposed set; no secondary misuse confirmed at publication. Q&A: vulnerability was previously published (not a zero-day) with a medium CVSS rating; product/CVE withheld for security. Primary: Digital Agency notice; secondary: BleepingComputer.
Digital Agency (Japan) — GSS unauthorised access / possible personal information leak (11 Sep 2026)
Socket Threat Research (Kush Pandya, 11 September 2026; The Hacker News 14 September) documents cross-store browser extension "Twitch Enhanced Viewer | JeetBot" forwarding live Twitch OAuth session tokens to proxies run by a Russian commercial Twitch/Kick/VK-Live bot service. Chrome Web Store ID pnhhdhhcadcjfckjhpmjneldiegbojfb (~30,000 users, published June 2025) and Firefox Add-ons twitchenhancedviewer@example.com (~550–600 users). Current v85.x builds append the token as an &auth= query parameter on redirects toward operator proxies when fetching usher.ttvnw.net playlists (every channel except a hardcoded allowlist of ten mostly Russian-language streamers). Tokens can reach chat, whispers, and account settings and land in cleartext proxy logs. Earlier v4.x builds POSTed tokens to a set-token endpoint. Operator docs later claim Firefox 85.8.7 stops sending tokens to proxies and a Chrome equivalent is under review; users should remove or update the extension and treat Twitch sessions as exposed until credentials are rotated. Distinct from peep-chrome-edge-20260907 and chrome-edge-extensions-superior-20260827. Primary: Socket; secondary: THN.
Anthropic’s September 2026 Threat Intelligence report (Detecting and countering misuse of AI; activity December 2025–August 2026) case GTG-30005 covers an Iran-nexus threat actor that used Claude to collect and analyse publicly accessible data to develop targeting recommendations against US naval forces in the Middle East. Anthropic says the actor built a Claude-assisted Python pipeline to compile targeting handbooks: US personnel rosters scraped from captions on public military photographs; publicly accessible ship and aircraft transponder identifiers; commercial satellite-imagery query scripts; and an inventory of public sites exposing US naval movements. The same case directed Claude at vulnerability research on shipboard systems (known CVEs in maritime VSAT terminals, Cisco communications equipment, and industrial control products). Anthropic disrupted the activity, banned associated accounts, and shared threat info with partners. Wire coverage (TWZ / WSJ) notes the dual-use account also touched domestic surveillance tooling in the same report cluster; this card is the naval-targeting case only. Distinct from anthropic-yemen-weapons-gnc-20260911 (northern Yemen GNC), anthropic-shinyhunters-apk-20260911, and anthropic-gtg20006-midnight-blizzard-20260911 (same TI report, different cases). Primary: Anthropic TI; secondary: The War Zone summary of the GTG-30005 naval case.
Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI (Sep 2026 TI)
Anthropic’s September 2026 Threat Intelligence report (Detecting and countering misuse of AI; activity December 2025–August 2026) details a northern Yemen weapons-development cell running three programs: a guided rocket using a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant “R2000” set including a hypersonic glide vehicle variant. Actors used Claude Code in place of human software engineers for guidance, navigation and control (GNC) — integrating open-source autopilot onto phone-class flight computers, writing control/position-estimation software, tuning settings, running firmware builds and simulations — and ran multiple Claude instances in parallel roles (code, research, review). Safeguards blocked many requests; actors hid goals/products and split work across sessions. Anthropic does not have evidence they fielded an operational device, but they did test-fire a guided rocket that appears to have failed (they returned to Claude within hours to diagnose). Accounts banned; threat info shared with partners. Actors had already built an offline simulation toolkit that does not rely on Claude or MATLAB. Anthropic does not name the actors; northern Yemen is Houthi-controlled territory (wire coverage notes that context). Distinct from desk cards anthropic-shinyhunters-apk-20260911 and anthropic-gtg20006-midnight-blizzard-20260911 (same TI report, different cases). Primary: Anthropic TI; wire: SecurityWeek / AP.
Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI (Sep 2026 TI)
