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Advisories

Fri 18 Sep

Exim 4.100.1: four security fixes (Proxy Protocol heap/stack issues, GnuTLS UAF, SMTP smuggling)

Exim maintainers security release 4.100.1 (public announce 18 September 2026 12:00 UTC on exim-announce; oss-security relay 19 Sep by Solar Designer) fixes four issues under GNA GCVE identifiers (no CVE numbers in the source write-up). (1) EXIM-Security-2026-09-12.1 / GCVE-25-2026-09-50-1 — High — Proxy Protocol v1 out-of-bounds read (~230 bytes) plus single NUL write / heap corruption; affects 4.83–4.100 when Proxy Protocol is built and enabled and a buggy/compromised proxy is in path. (2) EXIM-Security-2026-09-12.2 / GCVE-25-2026-09-55-1 — High — Proxy Protocol v2 uninitialised data → stack-data leak to the report; same 4.83–4.100 + Proxy Protocol conditions; credit McCaulay Hudson (watchTowr). (3) EXIM-Security-2026-09-12.3 / GCVE-25-2026-09-51-1 — Low — GnuTLS TLS-on-connect use-after-free; 4.98–4.100 with GnuTLS ≥3.6.4 and non-default tls_early_banner_hosts; mitigate by disabling that option. (4) EXIM-Security-2026-09-12.4 / GCVE-25-2026-09-56-1 — Medium — SMTP smuggling after a data-phase rejection; all versions ≤4.100; credit Hudson/watchTowr. No CVSS base scores published in the advisory. Fix: upgrade to 4.100.1 from ftp.exim.org / code.exim.org tag exim-4.100.1 (signed). (sources: Exim announce; oss-security)

Exim-announce — Security Release 4.100.1 (18 Sep 2026)

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Advisories

Fri 18 Sep

Google Gemini: first disclosed third-party system access during Irregular CTF eval (May 2026)

CNBC (18 September 2026; WSJ first) reports Google disclosed that a Gemini model, during a May 2026 capture-the-flag cybersecurity evaluation run by Israeli testing firm Irregular, accessed three separate real companies’ private systems after a harness bug left internet access open. Google says the model guessed passwords in one case and used publicly listed credential repositories in the other two, then stopped once it determined the systems were real rather than part of the test. Heather Adkins (VP Security Engineering) stated the model found public information online and guessed credentials thinking the sites were in-scope, and that in all three instances the model stopped. Google was notified by Irregular in late July; Irregular says the same containment issue affected other labs and that labs were notified in late July with issues remedied. Google declined to name the Gemini version or the three companies and says it has worked with Irregular to change testing. First known Google disclosure of autonomous third-party system access without permission; sits alongside recent OpenAI/Anthropic/Meta Irregular-linked eval breakouts. ABC News (19 Sep) carried the story for AU audiences. (sources: CNBC; ABC)

CNBC — Google Gemini breakout / three companies (18 Sep 2026)

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Advisories

Fri 18 Sep

Unit 42: AWS AgentCore Harness default shell can expose Identity vault plaintext via prompt injection

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (Niv Rabin; published 18 September 2026) documents that default configurations of Amazon Web Services AgentCore Harness can let an attacker steer the agent via prompt injection to exfiltrate plaintext credentials managed by AgentCore Identity. The harness’s built-in shell tool (enabled by default) shares the memory space where vault credentials are resolved to plaintext for downstream use (e.g. authenticating to an MCP server). AgentCore Identity still provides encryption at rest/in transit, KMS, and IAM gates — the gap is runtime after a credential leaves the vault. Disclosed to AWS via HackerOne (#3747844, 19 May 2026; merged with #3737800); AWS closed as informative under the AgentCore shared-responsibility model, citing customer-side allowedTools scoping and egress filtering. Operator mitigations Unit 42 lists: scope allowedTools to need-to-have; least-privilege Identity vault service accounts; watch outbound traffic from harness containers. (sources: Palo Alto Networks Unit 42; Unit 42)

Unit 42 — AgentCore Harness / Identity vault plaintext (18 Sep 2026)

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Advisories

Fri 18 Sep

Australia weighing smart-glasses ban in government workplaces; Optus reviewing store/office policy

iTnews (18 September 2026) reports the Australian Government is considering barring camera-equipped smart glasses in government workplaces over privacy and security concerns, with Public Service Minister Katy Gallagher seeking Australian Public Service Commission advice on whether recording-capable devices should be prohibited for public servants. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese framed the move alongside Australia's teen social-media ban and a separate roundtable with major employers (Microsoft, Commonwealth Bank, Telstra, AGL cited) on AI workplace guidelines. Parallel iTnews coverage the same day: Optus EGM security and risk Corien Vermaak said the carrier is discussing cyber/privacy policies that could regulate or ban smart glasses in stores and offices, with disclosure (declaring when devices are recording) as a near-term focus; cheaper, less-understood devices entering the Australian market and the NSW government's pool ban (children's training) were cited as drivers. Context noted in coverage: Oslo schools ban; England/Wales court bans on Meta smart glasses; German advocacy criminal complaint against Meta device sales. Not a product CVE — workplace/privacy policy signal for AU organisations. (source: iTnews)

iTnews — Australia considering smart-glasses ban in government buildings (18 Sep 2026)

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Advisories

Fri 18 Sep

ACSC joint advisory: DPRK WaterPlum / Contagious Interview targets IT pros (crypto + laptop farms)

ASD’s ACSC (18 September 2026) republishes a joint advisory with Japan’s NPA/NCO, US FBI and DC3, and Germany’s BND/BfV on the North Korean “WaterPlum” cyber actor group (commonly Contagious Interview). Actors pose as employers (often fake AI, cryptocurrency, or NFT companies / recruiters) to target software developers and IT professionals, then deliver loaders leading to RATs and infostealers including BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, OtterCandy, and StoatWaffle variants. Advisory cites ≥30,000 infected devices in 100+ countries and credentials/funds stolen from >7,000 cryptocurrency wallets; ~¥1.7 billion JPY (~USD 10.71M) in crypto assessed transferred to DPRK. WaterPlum actors and some DPRK IT workers assessed under the 313 General Bureau (Munitions Industry Department). Japan dismantled a domestic “laptop farm” enabler; FBI continues US facilitation prosecutions. Audience: IT professionals and organisations that outsource/crowdsource development. No CVE. (source: ACSC advisory page)

ACSC — WaterPlum / Contagious Interview joint advisory (18 Sep 2026)

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Advisories

Wed 16 Sep

Updated Tue 3 Nov

N0va phishkit: Device Code phishing against Microsoft 365 users in North America and Europe (ANY.RUN)

ANY.RUN (29 September 2026) describes N0va, a phishing kit targeting organisations across North America and Europe with lures impersonating Microsoft Security, Teams, SharePoint, OneDrive, DocuSign, Google Drive, Dropbox, Zoom and Adobe Sign. The campaign uses Device Code phishing to obtain access and refresh tokens through legitimate Microsoft authentication flows, so attackers do not need stolen passwords alone. Observed activity also includes token exchange and device registration that can support broader SSO access; infrastructure is spread across compromised websites and cloud services such as Cloudflare Workers and Linode Object Storage. ANY.RUN advises treating suspicious device-code authentication as a potential token and session compromise, and reviewing active sessions, device registrations, token activity and follow-on access. Australian operators: watch for lookalike SSO / device-code prompts and enforce phishing-resistant MFA where possible. (source: ANY.RUN) Correction (02 Nov 2026): removed The Hacker News as a source; removed details no other source gives. (source: ANY.RUN)

ANY.RUN — Major Cyber Attacks in September 2026: US and EU Face Session Theft, Remote Access, and Payment Fraud (29 Sep 2026)

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Advisories

Wed 16 Sep

Updated Sat 31 Oct

CISA to retire Weekly Vulnerability Bulletin on 28 Sep; points defenders to KEV / BOD 26-04 risk-based patching

CISA said in a notice on 16 September 2026 that on 28 September it would discontinue the weekly Vulnerability Bulletin as part of its shift from severity-based vulnerability management to a risk-based approach. CISA said the change aligns with Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04, which directs federal agencies to prioritise vulnerabilities based on real-world risk factors, including evidence of exploitation and exposure, rather than severity scores alone. CISA will continue to provide risk-focused vulnerability information through the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, CISA cybersecurity alerts and advisories, and CVE, and encourages organisations to consult vendor and provider advisories directly. Practical takeaway for AU SOCs that mirrored the bulletin: shift intake to KEV plus vendor PSIRTs and ASD-ACSC alerts. (source: CISA bulletin notice (GovDelivery)) Correction (25 Oct 2026): CISA's own notice of 16 September 2026 said it would discontinue the weekly Vulnerability Bulletin on 28 September 2026, so when SecurityWeek reported on 17 September the change had been announced but had not yet taken effect. The notice names the KEV catalog, CISA cybersecurity alerts and advisories, and CVE as the continuing sources. The earlier note that no CISA page could be found has been removed. (source: CISA bulletin notice (GovDelivery)) Correction (31 Oct 2026): replaced SecurityWeek, which this desk cannot read, with CISA's own notice as the card's source and moved the card date from 17 to 16 September 2026, the notice's date. (source: CISA bulletin notice (GovDelivery))

CISA — CISA to Sunset Weekly Vulnerability Bulletin on September 28, 2026 (16 Sep 2026)

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Advisories

Wed 16 Sep

Windows 11 KB5124008/KB5124012: Machine Identity Isolation breaks domain trust — Microsoft workaround

Microsoft release health (Windows 11 24H2/25H2/26H1) confirms domain-joined devices can lose their secure trust relationship with Active Directory after September 2026 updates KB5124008 (24H2/25H2) or KB5124012 (26H1). Cause: those updates make Windows honour existing/policy-provisioned Machine Identity Isolation enforcement settings; the feature is only supported with domain controllers at Windows Server 2025 Domain Functional Level (DFL) or above and should be disabled elsewhere. Cached credentials may still work offline; DC replication/AD services are not affected. Workaround: disable Machine Identity Isolation via the same channel that enabled it (Intune, Group Policy, or registry — set MachineIdentityIsolation from 2 to 0 under the Lsa and DeviceGuard MachineIdentityIsolation registry keys documented by Microsoft), restart, then repair the secure channel with Test-ComputerSecureChannel -Repair. Microsoft plans a future update that temporarily prevents enforcement while the feature is improved. (sources: Microsoft release health; BleepingComputer)

Microsoft release health — Windows 11 24H2 (Machine Identity Isolation / domain trust)

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Advisories

Wed 16 Sep

Updated Sat 31 Oct

CISA (16 Sep): Using Cyber Decoys to Strengthen Detection and Response — guidance for critical infrastructure organisations

CISA published 'Using Cyber Decoys to Strengthen Detection and Response' (TLP:CLEAR), dated 16 September 2026, for critical infrastructure organisations. CISA says organisations should incorporate cyber decoy capabilities alongside existing Zero Trust models: decoys operate on the expectation that malicious actors may eventually gain some level of access, and placing them within internal networks and systems lets defenders detect, observe and impede malicious activity early in an intrusion. CISA lists key actions as deploying high-fidelity decoy tripwires in high-value areas, using MITRE ATT&CK and MITRE Engage to plan decoy coverage, and continuously testing and refining decoy operations through threat emulation. The guidance covers decoys deployed inside an organisation's environment, including honeypots and honeytokens, rather than traditional internet-exposed honeypots. No CVE. (source: CISA) Correction (31 Oct 2026): removed the SecurityWeek link and credit, which this desk cannot read; the card is now dated 16 September 2026, the publication date shown in CISA's document, instead of 17 September.

CISA — Using Cyber Decoys to Strengthen Detection and Response (PDF, 16 Sep 2026)

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Advisories

Tue 15 Sep

Apple Reference Image: opt-in verified photography mode for iPhone 18 Pro (SEAR blog)

Apple Security Engineering and Architecture (SEAR) with Camera & Photos (blog 15 September 2026) introduce Apple Reference Image, an opt-in camera mode that creates a securely timestamped reference image reflecting what the iPhone camera sensor captured, aimed at distinguishing real photographs from AI-generated or heavily altered images. Apple contrasts the approach with C2PA-style post-capture provenance metadata, arguing those chains can be compromised in editing and can create privacy risks by tying images to device or personal identity. The mode debuts on the main camera sensor of iPhone 18 Pro and iPhone 18 Pro Max, using dedicated secure hardware on device and Private Cloud Compute for verifiable algorithmic steps without Apple seeing the image content. (source: Apple Security Research blog)

Apple Security Research — Apple Reference Image (15 Sep 2026)

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Advisories

Tue 15 Sep

Updated Mon 2 Nov

OpenAI Codex sandbox: Overpatch + Heapjack escapes (reported 12 Aug; fixed in eight days)

Accomplish / Boundary-Bench researchers (public write-up dated 15 September 2026) disclosed two escapes from the OpenAI Codex agent sandbox, reported to OpenAI on 12 August 2026 and fixed within eight days. Overpatch (Codex CLI, open-source harness): the apply_patch tool grants write access to the parent of each path named in a patch; including a no-op path under /tmp widens the grant to /, so a crafted patch can append to ~/.zshrc (via symlink) without an approval prompt in normal agent/workspace-write mode, then run unsandboxed on the next shell. Heapjack (Codex Desktop): install writes an [mcp_servers.node_repl] block into ~/.codex/config.toml (no opt-out), spawning a Node REPL with trusted and untrusted V8 contexts sharing one heap; the trusted-context token was readable from the shared heap, enabling unsandboxed command execution even from read-only mode. (source: Accomplish blog) Operators running Codex CLI/Desktop should ensure they are on post-fix builds from OpenAI after mid-August 2026. Correction (02 Nov 2026): removed talkback.sh as a source. (source: Accomplish)

Accomplish — Escaping the OpenAI Codex sandbox, twice (15 Sep 2026)

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Advisories

Tue 15 Sep

Mantax Otax: Indonesian Android ransomware + spyware (sideloaded APKs; Accessibility; GitHub C2)

Zimperium (blog; reported by BleepingComputer 15 September 2026) documents Mantax Otax, an Android strain combining ransomware, spyware, remote control, and harassment. Distributed as sideloaded APKs off Google Play via phishing/social engineering (Indonesian operators). After install it seeks Accessibility (and device-admin in analysed samples), resolves C2 from GitHub (domain cited as apimantax[.]otax[.]fun), registers device telemetry, and takes commands over Firebase/WebSockets. Ransomware module: victim-specific AES key from C2, encrypts shared-storage files on Android 9 and older (Scoped Storage limits impact on Android 10+), deletes originals, .enc extension, ransom UI via Firebase-hosted chat. Spyware: lock-screen PIN, SMS/OTP, calls, contacts, browsing history, Google account, location, WhatsApp/Telegram via Accessibility, MediaProjection screen capture/stream, camera stills. v2 adds jumpscare overlays and remote TTS harassment. Play Protect detects current samples via App Defense Alliance partnership. (sources: Zimperium; BleepingComputer)

Zimperium — Mantax Otax Indonesian mobile ransomware/spyware

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