Security firm Calif showed a series of iPhone attacks on stage at the Hexacon offensive-security conference in Paris on 16 October 2026. Its newsletter post lists four demos ('Signal 1-click', an iMessage demo, 'Can your iPhone do this?' and 'APT stands for Apple Persistent Threat') and says everything 'will be released in due time'. Stage video posted by jailbreak researcher Billy Ellis, as described by Decrypt, shows an iPhone 18 Pro running iOS 27.0.1 being rebooted, unlocked with its normal passcode, and an SSH session opened as root with about two minutes of uptime, so root access came back on its own after the restart with no computer attached (an untethered jailbreak). heise online reports the chain works on versions up to iOS 27.0.1, Apple's latest public release, and that AI helped find it. Calif has not named the vulnerabilities, released a tool or published a write-up; there are no CVE IDs and Apple has not commented. As of 29 October no source says whether any Apple update fixes the chain: Apple released iOS 27.2 on 26 October, and its security notes credit Calif.io researchers for several flaws but do not mention Hexacon or a jailbreak. No exploitation outside the demo has been reported. (sources: Calif newsletter; heise online) Correction (29 Oct 2026): the card said no fix had shipped, without giving a date; Apple has since released iOS 27.2 (26 October), and neither Apple nor Calif has said whether it fixes the demonstrated chain, so the card now says no fix is confirmed as of 29 October. (source: Apple)
Calif — iPhone: demos revealed at Hexacon Paris (16 Oct 2026)
The maintainers of Pion DTLS, the Go DTLS library used by the pion/webrtc stack and many Go real-time and IoT services, published six GitHub security advisories on 16 October 2026, all credited to Anthropic's OSS Scanner. GHSA-7c2r-jhm9-43vf (critical, CVSS 3.1 9.1) lets an attacker who can redirect a DTLS handshake and has the peer's public certificate impersonate that peer without its private key, because the library chose the verification primitive from the certificate's key type but took the digest from the attacker-controlled signature scheme; the maintainers note that checking the WebRTC SDP certificate fingerprint does not stop it, since the genuine certificate is presented. GHSA-hhpj-h56m-9f2p (critical, 9.1) lets an unauthenticated client skip required client-certificate checks by resuming a DTLS 1.2 session the server cached before the original handshake finished. GHSA-cqhp-ggp7-58qj (high, 7.4) is a similar bypass when an application shares one session store between its outbound connections and its listener. The other three are denial-of-service bugs: an unbounded handshake cache (memory exhaustion), oversized peer RSA keys (CPU exhaustion), and repeated client-certificate verification while the server waits for the client's Finished message. The maintainers say the two session-resumption bypasses do not affect pion/webrtc users, but the impersonation flaw and the DoS bugs can reach WebRTC applications acting as the DTLS server. No CVE IDs were listed at publication and no exploitation is reported. Fixes shipped in v3.1.13 (16 Oct) and v3.1.14 (16 Oct, the session-store fixes); the advisories list no patched v2 release. (sources: Pion DTLS GitHub security advisories; maintainer post on Hacker News)
Researcher Quentin Kaiser disclosed on 16 October 2026, at Hexacon in Paris and in a long write-up, a memory-corruption flaw in Broadcom's proprietary 802.11 Wi-Fi stack: an overflow in the reassembly of WPS EAP messages that can be triggered remotely over Wi-Fi without the network key or a completed WPS enrollment, giving controlled information disclosure and arbitrary code execution. He says the bug has been in Broadcom's SDK since at least 2010; Broadcom silently shipped an incomplete patch in 2018 and then advised OEMs to move to hostapd, leaving it a lasting 'forever day' on eCos-based chips (BCM3380, BCM3383, BCM33834) and a potential one on Linux-based chips (BCM3390, BCM65xx, BCM68xx) on any device that was never migrated. Broadcom declined to assign a CVE or publish an advisory, which Kaiser says is why so many OEMs never patched; he reported it under a 90-day timeline that expired on 16 October. He demonstrated working over-the-air exploitation against gateways from three of four Belgian ISPs (Proximus BBOX 3/3V+ Sagemcom F@st, VOO Netgear CG3100/CG3700 and Technicolor/Commscope models, Orange Belgium ASKEY TCG3000), showing a root shell and extraction of the Wi-Fi PSK from NVRAM, and says that as of 15 October none of the demonstrated devices were patched. The same Broadcom silicon ships worldwide in cable and DSL gateways from many vendors, so the blast radius extends well beyond Belgium; Kaiser released a fingerprinting script and a YARA rule to help map affected models. There is no indication of in-the-wild exploitation, and no Australian ISP or device has been named. (source: Quentin Kaiser research)
Quentin Kaiser — One Parser, Two Bugs, Many Routers: exploiting Broadcom Wi-Fi across eCos and Linux (16 Oct 2026)
Microsoft and NVIDIA published a joint paper, Risk Management for Open-Weight Models in Enterprise, on 16 October 2026, the first in a planned series of joint resources. Its core argument is that whether a model's weights are open does not by itself set an AI system's risk: risk depends on the model, the use case, the deployment and the safeguards around it. A model drafting internal documents carries different risk from the same model in a customer-facing workflow or connected to external data and tools, and the best control may sit in the inference environment or application rather than the model. The paper offers a shared taxonomy with five risk categories (cybersecurity, data protection, content, human-AI interaction, and bias), grounded in ISO standards and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and maps evaluations to selected risks so teams can produce evidence for the risks that matter in their deployment. Microsoft stresses the taxonomy is not a policy or deployment checklist. The paper also notes that organisations running their own open-weight deployments may take on safeguards that a managed service would otherwise provide. This first paper covers mainly the model layer; Microsoft says evaluating a model alone does not establish that an agent or application is safe, and later papers are meant to cover the runtime, harness and application layers. A companion GitHub repository in NVIDIA's organisation, co-maintained by both companies, will collect further evaluations, including community contributions. (sources: Microsoft Security blog; NVIDIA GitHub)
Microsoft Security blog — Managing open-weight model risk in enterprise deployments (16 Oct 2026)
Security firm Calif published research and full exploit code on 16 October 2026 showing local privilege escalation to root on OpenBSD 7.9 with KARL kernel relinking, SMAP and SMEP enabled, and without any information-leak bug. The chain starts with shm_nattch, the System V shared-memory attach counter, which has been a signed 16-bit short since the original 1988 BSD sources: mapping 127 segments and forking 259 processes wraps it to -32,643, and a race then frees kernel memory other processes still use. A separate out-of-bounds write corrupts multicast-membership counters so that later decrements alter page-table entries, making a user mapping supervisor-accessible; the exploit then overwrites a function pointer that sits at a predictable kernel address because OpenBSD's boot-time and best-fit allocators are not randomised. OpenBSD fixed the integer overflow in errata 018 on 14 September 2026, labelled a reliability fix, and the reference-counting use-after-free in errata 026 on 30 September, labelled a security fix; both apply to all architectures through syspatch, and OpenBSD 7.8 also received the overflow fix. No CVE has been assigned and there is no report of use in attacks. Calif also proposes kernel hardening such as safe unlinking for linked lists and allocator randomisation. (sources: OpenBSD 7.9 errata; Calif; The Hacker News)
The Apache Kylin project published five CVE records on 16 October 2026 for the open-source OLAP analytics engine, all fixed in Kylin 5.0.5. CVE-2026-64959, which Apache rates critical, is a backend cache API that is missing authentication and can execute injected SQL (Kylin 5.0 to 5.0.4). The others, affecting Kylin 4 through 5.0.4, are CVE-2026-68571, code injection through a special parameter in a JDBC URL (moderate); CVE-2026-64610, unsafe Java deserialisation from a broken external cache service (moderate); CVE-2026-63619, a metadata dump API without enough authorisation or path confinement (moderate); and CVE-2026-63618, exposure of system configuration information (important; CISA's enrichment scores it CVSS 3.1 7.5). Apache says the impact falls mostly on Kylin services exposed directly to the internet, which it describes as uncommon, and that in-house deployments are mostly unaffected. No exploitation is reported. (source: Apache Kylin)
On 16 October 2026 NIST's Center for Advancing Innovation and Standards for Super Intelligence (CAISSI), the NSA Super Intelligence Security Center and CISA published Key Practices for Incident Readiness and Response in Super Intelligence Training and Evaluation. The voluntary document sets out ten practices across preparation, detection, response, recovery and reporting for organisations that train or evaluate highly capable super-intelligence (SI) agents — especially pre-deployment systems with reduced safeguards. An SI control incident is defined as one or more agents taking uninstructed actions that conflict with operator policies, controls or human oversight. Guidance covers limiting agent access to information, systems, tools and networks; preserving evidence and shutting down undesired behaviour; rebuilding from verified baselines; and reporting incidents and near-misses to agencies and affected parties. It builds on NIST SP 800-61r3 and a May 2026 NIST SI Incident Management workshop, and responds to the White House 2025 SI Action Plan recommendation to fold SI incident response into existing doctrine. (sources: NIST news release; CISA resource page)
NIST — Key Practices for Incident Readiness and Response in Super Intelligence Training and Evaluation (16 Oct 2026)
iTnews reported on 16 October 2026 that WAGD, an Australian dog-harness retailer on Shopify, remains closed on Shopify's advice after malicious JavaScript delivered through third-party theme extensions redirected at least one shopper to a fake checkout on 13 October. Logbase, maker of the Selleasy upsell app (claimed 49,000+ active stores), said an unauthorised party accessed an internal Selleasy tool and added a malicious script to store settings; the attack window was 07:47–15:00 UTC on 13 October (evening into early morning AEST). Logbase said Shopify confirmed at 15:40 UTC that malicious code delivered through Selleasy had been removed, then locked the abused setting, tightened authentication and hired a third-party firm. Selleasy is currently listed as unavailable on the Shopify App Store. HulkApps separately disclosed that unauthorised configurations altered its Hulk Product Options theme extension in a global attack; developer Roman Zipp documented a function named hijack that cancelled the real checkout click and sent shoppers to lookalike payment domains including biliing[.]top and checkout-confirm[.]top, firing only once per browser session. Shopify temporarily disabled the HulkApps extension while the code was removed. Logbase said it has no evidence of a breach of its own systems but cannot rule out customers entering details on the fake pages. Shopify did not reply to iTnews before publication. (source: iTnews)
iTnews — Shopify tells Australian store to stay shut after hijacked extensions divert shoppers (16 Oct 2026)
BleepingComputer reported on 16 October 2026 that a cyberattack on government contractor BAE Systems has taken down the notice system used by US federal bankruptcy courts. According to BleepingComputer, the Administrative Office of the US Courts (AOUSC) said in a Thursday press release that the attack halted the production and distribution of bankruptcy notices, and that "all access to the BNC systems and websites that BAE operates on behalf of the Judiciary and the related bankruptcy noticing process are unavailable at this time, including bnc.uscourts.gov, bankruptcynotices.uscourts.gov, notices.uscourts.gov, and the National Creditor Registration Service." The AOUSC said it has been in communication with the impacted courts and is coordinating with BAE Systems, which is "actively investigating this incident and working to restore operations". A BAE Systems spokesperson told BleepingComputer: "We are aware of a security incident that is isolated to the BNC system and have taken immediate steps to address it." BleepingComputer notes the federal judiciary said last year that it was strengthening cybersecurity defences after a cyberattack on its electronic case management systems. (source: BleepingComputer) Correction (29 Oct 2026): the card date has moved from 15 to 16 October 2026, the date of BleepingComputer's report, and the card is now sourced to BleepingComputer because the US Courts release returns a server error to Cyberstack. Removed: a sentence on the Bankruptcy Noticing Center's role that BleepingComputer does not state, a statement that neither party had described the attack, and internal source labels. (source: BleepingComputer)
BleepingComputer — BAE Systems cyberattack disrupts US federal court operations (16 Oct 2026)
ABC News reported on 16 October 2026 that newly surfaced emails show sensitive Australian federal court transcription data was sent to India more than a decade ago under Auscript, and that court leadership treated the 2014 disclosure as a minor issue despite contract language forbidding transfer of information outside Australia. Former Auscript national manager Paul Cutbush raised Public Interest Disclosures with the family court, Federal Court and AFP in December 2014; a 2016 family court reply said there was 'no express provision' preventing offshore work, while Cutbush says the contract did forbid it. ABC links that history to VIQ Solutions (Auscript's successor), which earlier in 2026 breached its Commonwealth contract by allowing highly sensitive court files to be accessed in India; shortly after ABC coverage of that breach, VIQ was put into liquidation amid calls for a forensic audit and national-security concerns. A Federal Circuit and Family Court spokesperson said current leadership was unaware of the earlier Auscript offshoring. Shadow Attorney-General Michaela Cash and Greens leader David Shoebridge called for investigation. (source: ABC News)
ABC News — Federal courts knew Australian data was sent to India more than a decade ago but took no action (16 Oct 2026)
Poole Group, a Sunshine Coast accounting and business advisory firm founded in 1980, was listed on the LockBit ransomware gang's leak site, according to Banking Daily (16 October). On 16 October a company spokesperson told Banking Daily / Cyber Daily that Poole Group is responding to a cyber incident that affected part of its IT environment in recent days: it implemented containment measures, engaged external cyber security specialists, and notified the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, the Australian Cyber Security Centre and the Australian Taxation Office. The investigation into nature and scope is ongoing; the firm says it will contact individuals directly if it determines any were affected. According to Banking Daily, the gang did not disclose what data it allegedly took or list a ransom value. Accounting firms hold tax file numbers, identity documents and financial records, so clients should watch for targeted phishing or invoice-redirection attempts. (source: Banking Daily company statement) Correction (25 Oct 2026): removed a leak-site tracker link and the gang's publication countdown; the listing is now credited to Banking Daily. The card date has moved from 14 to 16 October 2026, the Perth date of Banking Daily's report (16 October 09:38 AEST, 07:38 Perth time (AWST)); the earlier date came from the tracker. (source: Banking Daily)
Banking Daily — Poole Group investigating LockBit ransomware attack; OAIC, ACSC, ATO notified (16 Oct 2026)
Mitsubishi Electric published advisory 2026-006 on 15 October 2026 for multiple vulnerabilities in GENESIS, GENESIS64, ICONICS Suite, Hyper Historian, AnalytiX, MobileHMI, IoTWorX, MC Works64, GENESIS32 and BizViz, and CISA republished it on 27 October as ICS advisory ICSA-26-300-02 (Mitsubishi Electric's advisory, as republished by CISA). According to Mitsubishi Electric, CVE-2026-16436 (CVSS 4.0 9.2) is an authentication bypass because the challenge response used to unlock the system in the security challenge feature is common to all users and fixed, so a remote attacker who obtains it may be able to unlock the system; CVE-2026-16437 (7.1) lets a local administrator unlock the system by tampering with the management file that stores the challenge response; CVE-2026-16438 (9.4) arises because the installers unnecessarily grant default DCOM permissions to the products' administrator account, so users with that account can locally or remotely launch and operate DCOM objects that should require UAC elevation; and CVE-2023-4863 (9.3), in the bundled libwebp component of GENESIS64 and ICONICS Suite 10.97 to 10.97.2, lets an attacker logged in locally execute arbitrary code by importing a crafted file as an administrator. Mitsubishi Electric says exploitation could result in information disclosure, tampering with, destruction or deletion of information, and a denial-of-service condition. It says there are no plans to release fixed versions of MC Works64, GENESIS32 or BizViz. CISA lists the products as deployed worldwide in critical manufacturing. (source: Mitsubishi Electric advisory 2026-006)
Mitsubishi Electric — Multiple vulnerabilities in GENESIS, GENESIS64, ICONICS Suite, Hyper Historian, AnalytiX, MobileHMI, IoTWorX, MC Works64, GENESIS32 and BizViz (advisory 2026-006, 15 Oct 2026)
