Splunk published five security advisories on 7 October 2026. SVD-2026-1001 lists 17 CVEs in Splunk Enterprise; the worst, CVE-2026-76268 (CVSS 3.1 9.8), affects 10.4 before 10.4.3 and 10.2 before 10.2.7: an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the Patroni REST API on a search head cluster member can run operating-system commands, because that interface does not require authentication for critical configuration operations. Versions 10.0.x and 9.4.x are not affected by that one. The same advisory also fixes a local privilege escalation to root through Linux package upgrades (CVE-2026-76266, 7.7), low-privilege access to other users' search jobs, queries and results (CVE-2026-76269, 6.5), SQL injection in the SPL2 module catalog (CVE-2026-76270, 6.5), an SSRF in the Splunk Observability Cloud app (CVE-2026-76274, 6.5) and several Splunk Secure Gateway authorisation gaps (CVE-2026-76265, 76272, 76280). SVD-2026-1002 groups internally found issues into five CVEs, the highest scored 9.8 (CVE-2026-76281, improper access control) and 9.0 (CVE-2026-76284, improper neutralisation). SVD-2026-1003 and SVD-2026-1005 cover third-party package updates in Splunk Enterprise and the Splunk Add-on for AWS, both rated Critical. SVD-2026-1004 fixes Splunk MCP Server before 1.2.1, which could send a user's Splunk authentication token to the URL of a custom API tool set up by another user (CVE-2026-76286, 5.3). Splunk does not report exploitation. (source: Splunk security advisories)
Splunk — SVD-2026-1001: Security Vulnerabilities in Splunk Enterprise, September/October 2026 (7 Oct 2026)
HashiCorp published four Vault security bulletins on 7 October 2026, all fixed in Vault Community Edition 2.1.2 and Vault Enterprise 2.1.2, 1.21.12, 1.20.17 and 1.19.23. HCSEC-2026-43 (CVE-2026-89322, CVSS 3.1 7.2): Vault did not always evaluate ACL policies against the canonical form of resource and policy names, so an authenticated user with delegated permissions could get around an explicit deny, reach a protected resource or assign a denied policy, and so escalate privileges. HCSEC-2026-41 (CVE-2026-105816, 8.0): with Shamir seals and an external plugin directory configured, a privileged operator who can restore an Integrated Storage (Raft) snapshot may be able to run arbitrary code on the Vault host, because stored plugin catalog entries were not checked to point inside the plugin directory. HCSEC-2026-40 (CVE-2026-105818, 5.9): under the default directory policy, the PKI secrets engine's ACME server could issue certificates containing identities the ACME challenge never validated, which could allow impersonation toward systems that trust that PKI mount (affects 1.14.0 and later). HCSEC-2026-42 (CVE-2026-105820, 5.4, Enterprise only): crafted policy names with path traversal let a token use policies from other namespaces, including the root namespace. HashiCorp does not report exploitation. (sources: HashiCorp security bulletins; CVE records)
HashiCorp — HCSEC-2026-43: Vault inconsistent ACL policy evaluation may allow bypass of deny restrictions (7 Oct 2026)
The US Justice Department said on 7 October 2026 that Zohar Pinhasi, 50, owner of Florida ransomware remediation company MonsterCloud LLC, was arraigned in the Eastern District of New York on two counts of wire fraud and one count of wire fraud conspiracy (docket 26-CR-271; indictment filed 23 September). Prosecutors allege that from June 2018 to June 2023 MonsterCloud told ransomware victims not to pay and claimed to have proprietary tools and advanced decryption techniques, but in practice contacted the attackers, paid them for decryption keys and charged clients far more than the ransom. In one example cited by the Justice Department, about US$8,200 went to a ransomware operator and the client was billed about US$150,000. Over the scheme he allegedly charged clients more than US$19 million and paid more than US$8 million in ransoms, with BleepingComputer reporting hundreds of affected companies in the US and Canada. Pinhasi pleaded not guilty and was released on a US$2 million bond, according to the US Attorney's Office. Each count carries a maximum of 20 years. For Australian organisations the case is a reminder that a paid recovery or negotiation firm may still be paying the attacker on your behalf, which can bring the ransomware payment reporting obligation under the Cyber Security Act 2024 into play. (sources: US Department of Justice; BleepingComputer) Related page (not a source): CyberStack knowledge page ransomware-payment-reporting.
US Department of Justice — Known cybersecurity expert and owner of Florida ransomware remediation company charged with defrauding clients (7 Oct 2026)
Cisco published two Critical advisories on 7 October 2026 for Cisco License On-Prem, the on-premises licensing server previously sold as Smart Software Manager (SSM) On-Prem. The first covers four bugs. CVE-2026-20328 (CVSS 9.1) is a broken check in the password-reset process of the web management interface: a remote attacker with no account can reset the password of any user, including administrators, and log in as them. CVE-2026-76454 (CVSS 9.1) is in the Smart Licensing Utility API, which lacks authentication and input validation, so a crafted request can write arbitrary files on the server or knock it over. Two lower-rated bugs, an authenticated OS command injection through submitted configuration (CVE-2026-76437) and an authenticated SQL injection (CVE-2026-76452), score 4.9 each. Gabriele Paris of the NATO Cyber Security Centre reported CVE-2026-20328, -76437 and -76452, and Trung Nguyen of CyStack reported CVE-2026-76454. The second advisory is a Critical 'security hardening release' grouping four internally found bugs (CVE-2026-76480 at 9.8, CVE-2026-76482 at 10.0, CVE-2026-76483 at 9.1, CVE-2026-76484 at 8.8). Both advisories say every configuration is affected and there are no workarounds. Cisco PSIRT knows of no public disclosure or malicious use. License On-Prem servers usually sit inside the network holding entitlement data for every Cisco device an organisation licenses, so an exposed management page is the main worry.
Lumen's Black Lotus Labs published research on 7 October 2026 into PoeLLM, Linux malware (an ELF file named libgcrypt) behind a cryptomining and exploit-scanning campaign aimed mainly at self-hosted AI infrastructure. Instead of a hard-coded server, each infected host reads a poem titled "On the Nature of Connection" from a dash.css file in a GitHub repository dressed up as a Node.js fork, picks out four words or phrases and turns them into an IPv4 address with a built-in dictionary; the operator moves command-and-control by editing the poem, which has been changed 11 times since the first commit on 13 April 2026. Black Lotus Labs first found the infrastructure while investigating Ivanti Sentry CVE-2026-10520, when a compromised Sentry appliance contacted 5.78.73[.]122 in early June and began scanning. Most victims run vulnerable, internet-exposed LiteLLM or Ollama, and hundreds run the Gotenberg PDF converter or Gitea; infected servers scan ports 3000 and 4000 (Gotenberg and LiteLLM) and try LiteLLM CVE-2026-42271, which Horizon3.ai showed can be chained with CVE-2026-48710 for unauthenticated code execution. The implant includes a remote shell, XMRig and Iron miners tied to the Russian mining service Kryptex, HTTP/S scanning and exploit delivery, and some command servers sat on compromised home routers. Lumen counted almost 2,200 affected servers at the mid-June peak with nearly 800 active a day, mostly in the US and Western Europe; BleepingComputer and The Hacker News report the live count has since passed 3,400. Lumen assesses with moderate confidence the operator speaks Italian, and says it has blocked all traffic to the known command servers. (sources: Lumen Black Lotus Labs; BleepingComputer)
Lumen Black Lotus Labs — Canto Incognito: tracking the PoeLLM malware (7 Oct 2026)
JFrog disclosed CVE-2026-105192 on 7 October 2026, a critical flaw in LMCache, the open-source key-value cache that speeds up LLM serving engines such as vLLM. In multiprocess (distributed) mode LMCache runs as a standalone server and opens a ZeroMQ socket, port 5555 by default, so worker processes can register and share cached blocks. That socket has no authentication. One message type carries a msgpack extension that is handed to Python's pickle.loads while the server is still decoding the REGISTER_KV_CACHE arguments, before any handler or type check runs, so a single crafted message executes the sender's code as the LMCache user. JFrog says the official container images run that process as root. The 9.8 score applies when the server is bound to a routable address with --host, which is the documented multi-node setup and what LMCache's own example Kubernetes DaemonSet does (it listens on every interface); a default single-host install that stays on localhost is not reachable from other machines, and LMCache running inside a single vLLM process does not open the port at all. The decode path arrived in 0.3.9 (October 2025) and is still present in 0.5.5, the latest PyPI release, the 0.5.6 release candidates through rc3 and the dev branch as of 7 October. LMCache has not published its own advisory, and JFrog gives no way to tell whether a server has already been hit. Separately, one GitHub account opened six more LMCache security reports on 6 October alleging unauthenticated cross-tenant cache access and command-running network services; those have no CVE or maintainer confirmation. Researcher: Yuval Moravchick (JFrog). (sources: JFrog Security Research advisory JFSA-2026-001694382; The Hacker News) Correction (22 Oct 2026): this card said no fixed release existed and that LMCache had not published its own advisory. LMCache published advisory GHSA-w5f2-9q9c-ff4h on 13 October (CVSS 3.1 9.8) listing 0.3.9 up to 0.5.6 as affected and 0.5.6 as the fix; 0.5.6 was released on PyPI on 15 October. (source: LMCache GitHub advisory GHSA-w5f2-9q9c-ff4h)
JFrog Security Research — LMCache unauthenticated RCE via pickle deserialization on the multiprocess ZMQ transport, CVE-2026-105192 (7 Oct 2026)
Oasis Security has analysed files recovered from an attacker-controlled, US-based server used against two of South Korea's largest churches, which it does not name. Researchers collected the files between 28 August and 1 September 2026; Cyber Security News reported the findings on 7 October. At the first church, a web shell on the enterprise resource planning (ERP) system let the attackers decrypt database settings, gain administrator access to Microsoft SQL Server and use xp_cmdshell to run commands and move to linked systems, opening member, accounting, access-control, library, chat and mail databases; they also got past a database-monitoring control, recovered a MariaDB root password and used hardcoded NAS credentials to reach backup storage. That haul held about 960,000 congregant records updated in the past two years, including names and resident registration numbers, about 330,000 donation records, 68,000 document records, more than 14,000 chats and 6,874 login accounts; 47.3 GB in 13,939 files was found staged in a compromised MinIO bucket. The second church was entered earlier with leaked credentials and insecure direct object reference (IDOR) flaws in its groupware and membership (SIMS) systems: from a normal member session the attackers could see other users' plaintext PINs and reset a manager-level account, then reached SAP and took about 89,000 congregant records, 383 employee records and approval documents. Oasis says third-party transfers mean the recovered volume is a lower bound and unique-person totals are unverified. (sources: Oasis Security; Cyber Security News)
Oasis Security — Analysis of cyber intrusions targeting major religious organisations in South Korea
Security researcher Oliver Fish says he found a way out of an OpenAI sandbox that let him send requests to paid AI models with no API key or account, Cyber Security News reported on 7 October 2026. A screenshot he shared shows OpenAI awarding US$300 for a report titled "Unauthenticated Sandbox Escape Enables Access to Internal OpenAI Responses API". If accurate, the flaw crossed two boundaries at once, sandbox isolation and API authentication, letting a remote user skip the normal identity and billing checks. Technical details are private: there is no public proof of concept, endpoint, list of affected models, CVE, exposure window or fix note, and no public evidence that customer data was reached or that anyone else used it. Fish criticised the size of the payout on X; OpenAI's Bugcrowd programme pays from US$200 for low-severity findings to US$20,000 for exceptional ones, so the award may reflect a lower internal severity rating, but OpenAI has not explained it. This is a researcher claim, not a confirmed incident. Source: Cyber Security News.
Cyber Security News — OpenAI sandbox escape flaw allowed free access to paid AI models without an API key (7 Oct 2026)
The Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner (OVIC) has published its investigation into the student data breach the Department of Education reported on 7 January 2026, and found the department contravened Information Privacy Principles 4.1 (security) and 4.2 (destroying data no longer needed). The Australian Signals Directorate issued a critical alert at 10am on 27 October 2025; the department passed it to school technicians the same afternoon, but not every school patched, and the department had no way of checking that they did. Attackers got in through one school's internet-facing server on or before 6 November 2025. A vendor detected the activity on 2 December, forensic work confirmed data had left on 23 December, and media reporting began on 14 January. The stolen database held every government school student's first name and surname, school, year level, school email address and encrypted password, and the same details for hundreds of thousands of former students, which the department kept so email addresses would not be reissued. OVIC called that retention disproportionate. It also found the department's vulnerability scanning did not cover every school and that critical findings were not always fixed. OVIC saw no evidence of misuse soon after the attack but notes the copy could be used later, a particular worry for families escaping violence or under protection orders. OVIC made seven recommendations due by 31 December 2026, including a plan to align with the Essential Eight. The department has accepted them, promised an archive policy for old student records by December and an internal audit in 2027, and plans centrally provided vulnerability management for schools by the end of 2028. OVIC's report does not name the vulnerability. (sources: OVIC investigation report; iTnews)
OVIC — Investigation into the data breach of student information held by the Department of Education (report, October 2026, PDF)
Solar 4RAYS, the threat research team of Russian security company Solar, published an investigation (reported by Cyber Security News on 7 October 2026) into a long intrusion at a medical organisation that it links to the group it calls Partisan Zmiy, based on overlapping infrastructure and techniques. The earliest evidence dates to early 2024 and the investigation began in December 2025, so the attackers had access for about two years; how they first got in is not known. They ran commands remotely, then moved through the network over legitimate remote desktop and Windows file sharing. VMware Tools had been installed long before but was not in use, so its folder became a trusted, unwatched place to drop malicious files named like real virtualisation components, with timestamps changed to match. Shortly before discovery the attackers swapped a genuine VMware library for an unsigned malicious one, keeping the original under another name. Windows services with plausible names started a previously undocumented loader, which ran an updated Vasilek backdoor and GOST tunnels on a schedule, including one tunnel open only from 10pm to 11pm each Saturday, likely as a backup way in. The organisation had two-way trust relationships with many subsidiary medical institutions, and the researchers read the case as espionage rather than disruption. Solar did not name the victim. (sources: Solar 4RAYS blog; Cyber Security News)
Solar 4RAYS — Partisan Zmiy: атаковала медицинскую организацию (blog, Russian)
Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) added the Angel One breach on 7 October 2026, so people can now check whether their email address is in it. HIBP says that in July 2024 the Indian stock brokerage confirmed that data leaked online related to a breach in April 2023, and that the leaked data included 7.9 million user records with 6.8 million unique email addresses, along with names, physical addresses, phone numbers, bank account numbers, Permanent Account Numbers (PANs, India's tax ID) and portfolio holdings; HIBP also lists dates of birth. In its July 2024 statement, reported by The Hindu BusinessLine, Angel One said no new data breach had occurred, that the issue related to an April 2023 incident that was promptly reported to the relevant authorities, and that "this incident has no impact on client securities, funds, or credentials". It also said the authenticity of the leaked data had not been validated. UPDATE 22 Oct 2026: added Angel One's own statement and attributed the breach details to Have I Been Pwned (source: The Hindu BusinessLine, 10 Jul 2024).
Have I Been Pwned — Angel One breach (added 7 Oct 2026; breach April 2023)
The Harbor project published GitHub security advisory GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w on 6 October 2026 (no CVE assigned): a project administrator can point an HTTP or Slack webhook at localhost, private ranges, link-local, or the cloud metadata endpoint 169.254.169.254. When an event fires, Harbor jobservice POSTs from inside the deployment; if the target returns an error status, the response body is written to the webhook execution log readable by project members — so a ProjectAdmin can reach internal services and skim error responses (including metadata-style leaks). CVSS 3.1 8.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N). Affected: Harbor with webhooks from 1.7.0 onward when untrusted users can become project admin (default Project Creation: Everyone makes every registered user a project admin of projects they create) and jobservice can reach internals. Fixed in 2.13.6, 2.14.5, 2.15.3 and 2.16.0+, which reject private/loopback/link-local webhook targets unless HARBOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_ACCESS / network.allow_private_network_access is deliberately re-enabled. Until then: set Project Creation to Admin Only, restrict jobservice egress, block 169.254.169.254, prefer IMDSv2. (sources: The Hacker News ThreatsDay; Harbor GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w)
Harbor GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w — SSRF in webhook delivery (6 Oct 2026)
