Vodafone's parent company TPG Telecom said it analysed millions of scam calls on the Vodafone network between July 2025 and July 2026 and found that 98 per cent of them, more than 24 million calls, came via Symbio, a little-known internet phone company owned by Aussie Broadband, according to ABC News, which reported the analysis on 22 October 2026. TPG executive Vanessa Hicks told the ABC that every time it sees such a campaign it gives the evidence to Aussie Broadband to investigate and block the bad actors, and that it wants more urgent action closer to the source. According to the ABC, Vodafone's fraud team found that police stations in Western Australia, Queensland and South Australia and the Australian Federal Police had been impersonated by calls from Symbio's network, with over 2,400 calls in one scam in a single week in September, Hicks said. Aussie Broadband chief executive Brian Maher told the ABC that Symbio has about 500 customers who on-sell its phone numbers, that Symbio has no oversight of who they sell numbers to, which makes stopping scammers very difficult, and that 'where we find a persistent bad actor, then we will disconnect them'; he said the company uses detection software and a team of more than 20 people, and has made 'significant progress' over the past month. The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) said in a statement to the ABC that checks on that particular police-impersonation scam showed regulation was working, that the traffic was identified, notifications were passed upstream and blocking occurred, that the apparent sources were multiple overseas telcos, and that it did not identify non-compliance by an Australian telco. The ABC reports that ACMA warned Symbio in 2024 after finding it did not properly investigate scam calls and failed to share information quickly with other telcos, and in 2022 over failing to investigate and trace scam calls. Information Age (ACS) reported on 27 October that Vodafone's analysis of 25 million scam calls found 24.8 million (98.35 per cent) came from Symbio's voice network, and that Vodafone contacted regulators more than 160 times. (sources: ABC News; Information Age)
ABC News — Vodafone's owner accuses rival Aussie Broadband of being behind millions of scam calls to customers (22 Oct 2026)
Forever Security says it found a malicious AGENTS.md file in the ~/Downloads folder of a real customer machine and stopped a coding agent, mid-session, from installing function-color, a known malicious npm package that Forever says npm has since removed. Forever says ~/Downloads is the one folder a website can write to on its own and that a web page can download a file named AGENTS.md there silently. Forever says it reproduced the attack on OpenAI Codex, which ran the malware in more than 90% of attempts in its testing, and on Claude Code, where a planted instructions file pointed Claude's API calls at Forever's own server and leaked Claude's OAuth login token, which Forever says it replayed to be served as the victim. Forever says there is nothing for OpenAI or Anthropic to patch, because an agent following the AGENTS.md in its folder is doing what it was built to do. Updated 25 Oct 2026 (BleepingComputer, 25 October 11:49 pm Perth): BleepingComputer reported that the researchers could not determine how the file got onto the customer's machine, and that the attack also needs the user to start their AI agent in that folder. Correction (26 Oct 2026): the card date has moved from 25 to 22 October 2026, the date of Forever Security's blog post. (source: BleepingComputer)
Forever Security — Markdown Is the New Executable: Attackers Are Dropping Agent Instructions Into Your Downloads Folder From the Web
METR said on 22 October 2026 that, from 21 July to 11 August, one METR employee and one Redwood Research employee ran a pilot high-access exercise to stress-test OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring system, with access to OpenAI's internal codebase, monitor prompts and configuration, and internal documentation. METR says the findings describe the system as it existed on and before 21 July, not OpenAI's later, expanded monitoring. Among the findings METR lists: a way Codex agents could in principle bypass Codex sandboxing and Auto-Review and take any action the host user could take; an exploit that would stop hundreds of recent agent actions from being monitored (details redacted by OpenAI); likely ways for agents to make the monitor fail through serialization differences between what agents and monitors see; two client-controllable headers that disable monitoring for new agents; and two unmonitored internal agentic tools thought to be read-only that a simple exploit could have subverted, which METR says it did not validate. METR estimates that roughly 75–94% of agentic internal Responses API traffic from models at least as strong as GPT-5.5 was eligible for monitoring at the time, with substantial uncertainty, and that RL training runs were not covered by the monitoring system at the start of the exercise. METR says OpenAI has since stated that all of the vulnerabilities it identified that affect OpenAI's production safeguards stack have been patched, and that METR has not evaluated those claims. METR says it agreed with OpenAI to publish only a brief, high-level post and that OpenAI could redact it. Updated 25 Oct 2026: The Hacker News reported the findings on 25 October (2:54 pm Perth). (source: The Hacker News)
METR — Red-Teaming OpenAI's Internal Agent Monitoring Systems (22 Oct 2026)
Fisher & Paykel Healthcare Corporation Limited, the respiratory care and sleep apnoea device maker, said in a statement issued from Auckland on 22 October 2026 that it had been made aware of unauthorised and unlawful access to two employee email accounts and a subset of company files, and that it immediately activated its response protocols to contain the incident and investigate. The company said some of the files accessed contained personally identifiable information, that it is in the process of notifying those affected and that it has notified relevant authorities. It said there has been no impact to its products, manufacturing operations or supply chain, that there is no evidence the activity compromised the system that maintains patient data, that it has identified no evidence of ransomware or malware, that it believes the incident has been contained, and that it does not expect any material impact on its financials or operations. The company has not said what kinds of personal information were in the files, how many people are affected or how the accounts were accessed. (sources: NZX announcement; CNA)
Web hosting provider Hostwinds said on its status page on 22 October 2026 (posted 14:44 UTC, 10:44 pm Perth) that it had 'identified unauthorized access to the system that runs the Hostwinds client area and billing', proactively took the client area offline as a precaution, is working with an independent forensic and cybersecurity firm, and has notified the appropriate law enforcement agencies. Hostwinds said customer servers and websites remained online, but that as a precaution it had disabled access to potentially impacted services, so some customers might not be able to sign in to their server. In an update posted on 24 October (18:11 UTC, 2:11 am Perth 25 Oct), Hostwinds said the client area is back online at clients.hostwinds.com, having reopened on the evening of 23 October on a newly built system; that as part of its response it has reset every client area password, so old passwords no longer work; that it has emailed customers with full details and steps to take; and that its investigation with an independent forensic firm is continuing. In that update Hostwinds said PayPal payments were temporarily unavailable while it reconnected them and that the affiliate portal (affiliates.hostwinds.com) remained offline. Hostwinds has not said what data, if any, was accessed or how the attacker got in. Hostwinds warns that it will never ask for passwords, SSH keys or full card numbers by email, chat or phone, and that a password reset email only arrives after the customer selects 'Forgot password' themselves. (sources: Hostwinds status page; Hostwinds password-reset instructions) UPDATE (25 Oct 2026): In a status post at 19:51 UTC on 24 October (3:51 am Perth 25 Oct), Hostwinds said PayPal payments are working again, that customers whose PayPal payment failed should try again, and that access to the client area remains restored; it said its investigation with an independent forensic firm is continuing. (source: Hostwinds System Status)
Hostwinds System Status — Security incident: PayPal payments restored (24 Oct 2026), Security incident: client area back online, action needed (24 Oct 2026) and Security incident: Hostwinds client area offline (22 Oct 2026)
On 22 October 2026 Microsoft's Security Update Guide published CVE-2026-110063, 'VM Inspector for Azure Virtual Machines Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability': improper link resolution before file access ('link following', CWE-59) in VM Inspector for Azure Virtual Machines allows an unauthorised attacker to elevate privileges over a network. Microsoft rates it Critical with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 10.0 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H). Microsoft's FAQ says the vulnerability has already been fully mitigated by Microsoft, there is no action for users of the service to take, and the CVE is published to provide further transparency. Microsoft lists it as not publicly disclosed and not exploited. It was one of six Microsoft cloud-service CVEs published that day; the others are on their own cards. (sources: Microsoft Security Response Center; CVE record)
Microsoft Security Response Center — CVE-2026-110063, VM Inspector for Azure Virtual Machines Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (22 Oct 2026)
On 22 October 2026 Microsoft's Security Update Guide published CVE-2026-96185, 'Microsoft Exchange Online Remote Code Execution Vulnerability': a stack-based buffer overflow (CWE-121) in Microsoft Exchange Online allows an authorised attacker to execute code over a network. Microsoft rates it Critical with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.5 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). Microsoft's FAQ says the vulnerability has already been fully mitigated by Microsoft, there is no action for users of the service to take, and the CVE is published to provide further transparency. Microsoft lists it as not publicly disclosed and not exploited. It was one of six Microsoft cloud-service CVEs published that day; the others are on their own cards. (sources: Microsoft Security Response Center; CVE record)
Microsoft Security Response Center — CVE-2026-96185, Microsoft Exchange Online Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (22 Oct 2026)
On 22 October 2026 Microsoft's Security Update Guide published CVE-2026-105014, 'Azure Pipelines Remote Code Execution Vulnerability': command injection (CWE-77) in Azure Pipelines allows an unauthorised attacker to execute code over a network. Microsoft rates it Critical with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N). Microsoft's temporal metrics mark exploit code maturity as proof-of-concept (E:P). Microsoft's FAQ says the vulnerability has already been fully mitigated by Microsoft, there is no action for users of the service to take, and the CVE is published to provide further transparency. Microsoft lists it as not publicly disclosed and not exploited. It was one of six Microsoft cloud-service CVEs published that day; the others are on their own cards. (sources: Microsoft Security Response Center; CVE record)
Microsoft Security Response Center — CVE-2026-105014, Azure Pipelines Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (22 Oct 2026)
On 22 October 2026 Microsoft's Security Update Guide published CVE-2026-83938, 'Azure Kubernetes Configuration Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability': missing authentication for a critical function (CWE-306) in Azure Kubernetes Configuration Service allows an unauthorised attacker to elevate privileges over a network. Microsoft rates it Critical with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 10.0 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H). Microsoft's FAQ says the vulnerability has already been fully mitigated by Microsoft, there is no action for users of the service to take, and the CVE is published to provide further transparency. Microsoft lists it as not publicly disclosed and not exploited. It was one of six Microsoft cloud-service CVEs published that day; the others are on their own cards. (sources: Microsoft Security Response Center; CVE record)
Microsoft Security Response Center — CVE-2026-83938, Azure Kubernetes Configuration Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (22 Oct 2026)
On 22 October 2026 Microsoft's Security Update Guide published CVE-2026-108456, 'Azure AI Foundry Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability': server-side request forgery (CWE-918) in Azure AI Foundry allows an authorised attacker to elevate privileges over a network. Microsoft rates it Critical with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.7 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N). Microsoft's FAQ says the vulnerability has already been fully mitigated by Microsoft, there is no action for users of the service to take, and the CVE is published to provide further transparency. Microsoft lists it as not publicly disclosed and not exploited. It was one of six Microsoft cloud-service CVEs published that day; the others are on their own cards. (sources: Microsoft Security Response Center; CVE record)
Microsoft Security Response Center — CVE-2026-108456, Azure AI Foundry Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (22 Oct 2026)
Kaspersky's Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) said on 22 October 2026 that in early 2026 it identified a complex APT attack on diplomatic agencies in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that used a UEFI bootkit it named BlackX, which it found to be similar to the BlackLotus bootkit. Kaspersky says the attackers deployed BlackX after compromising victim networks and obtaining administrator privileges, dropping an installer (inst.exe) and an RC4-encrypted file (PVMDIJGKAX2) that write files to the system and UEFI partitions to exploit the Baton Drop vulnerability (CVE-2022-21894) and install custom Machine Owner Keys (MOK), allowing arbitrary EFI files to load. Because BlackLotus source code has never been published, Kaspersky says the attackers either reverse-engineered BlackLotus or bought its source code. The UEFI payload injects a kernel driver, signed with a since-revoked certificate of 'Wenjiang District Mingyu Network Technology Service Studio', that disables security-product callbacks, tampers with ETW providers and protects the bootkit files; it drops user-mode espionage payloads: a RAT that uses Google Drive, OneDrive or Yandex.Disk for command and control, and an OLLVM-obfuscated DLL Kaspersky calls OxiDLLRunner, side-loaded by a legitimate googleupdate.exe, that runs a Rust payload talking to www[.]archivetj[.]com. Kaspersky attributes the attack to APT41 with medium confidence, citing the 'xdd' identifier shared with a FishMonger kernel implant described by ESET in June 2026, DLL side-loading and OLLVM obfuscation. Kaspersky says the targeted machines were fully patched: the Baton Drop fix revokes the 'Windows Production PCA 2011' certificate only when an administrator triggers it manually, Microsoft's planned automatic 'Enforcement Phase' has not been implemented, and the certificate's expiry on 19 October 2026 does not stop vulnerable binaries loading unless it is blocklisted. Microsoft's own guidance says the mitigations for the related BlackLotus Secure Boot bypass (CVE-2023-24932) are included in Windows security updates since 9 July 2024 but are not enabled by default, and that this malware requires physical or administrative access to the device. (source: Kaspersky Securelist) Updated 23 Oct 2026: The Hacker News reported the research. (source: The Hacker News)
Kaspersky Securelist — New BlackX UEFI bootkit exploiting Baton Drop (22 Oct 2026)
Eye Security's research team said on 22 October 2026 that between November 2025 and March 2026 it actively disabled the vulnerable update mechanism in Time4Popcorn, a fork of the Popcorn Time BitTorrent streaming client, by executing code on systems running it. The flaw is CVE-2026-30612, which the CVE record describes as allowing a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code through updater.exe on Windows and PT.updd on macOS in Time4Popcorn for Windows up to 6.2.1.18, for macOS up to 6.2.1.17 and for Android up to 3.5.0.173; CISA's ADP enrichment scores it CVSS 3.1 9.8. Eye Security says it found an Updater.exe at a client trying to reach the lapsed domain popcorntimeupd.xyz. After registering it, Eye found the updater would download and run any executable named in a JSON reply with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges, with no code signing and over unencrypted HTTP; on macOS a pushed update ran as root. It estimates it encountered about 2.5 to 3.0 million Windows hosts and 250,000 to 350,000 macOS hosts, connecting mostly from home ISPs but also from government, military and corporate networks around the world. Eye says its update only stopped and disabled the updater service, with no telemetry or file deletion, and that it had to adjust the code to get past endpoint products that flagged it. It says more than a million systems were updated by December 2025, it sent over 2 million update downloads in total, and update requests had fallen 98% by 1 March 2026. In late March it handed the 15 domains it controlled to The Shadowserver Foundation; some other update domains are still owned by third parties. Eye did not touch Android, where updates need user interaction, and says the application itself remains unsafe: it is built on a 2014 Chrome engine with the sandbox disabled, loads content over plain HTTP and loaded JavaScript from abandoned domains, and Eye has a proof of concept that runs calc.exe through JavaScript. (source: Eye Security) Updated 23 Oct 2026: BleepingComputer reported the research. (source: BleepingComputer)
Eye Security — Operation IXIM: Preventing a botnet of millions of Popcorn Time users (22 Oct 2026)
