Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
- ID
- T1055.001
- Tactics
- TA0004 Privilege Escalation, TA0005 Stealth
- Sub-technique of
- T1055 Process Injection
- Platforms
- Windows
- Data sources
- Process Access, Process Creation, Module Load, Named Pipe Metadata
- Source
- attack.mitre.org
- MITRE last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
DLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). [1]
Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary).[2][1]
Another variation of this method, often referred to as Module Stomping/Overloading or DLL Hollowing, may be leveraged to conceal injected code within a process. This method involves loading a legitimate DLL into a remote process then manually overwriting the module's AddressOfEntryPoint before starting a new thread in the target process.[3] This variation allows attackers to hide malicious injected code by potentially backing its execution with a legitimate DLL file on disk.[4]
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Detection
- DET0389 Behavioral Detection of DLL Injection via Windows API
Data components: Process Access, Process Creation, Module Load, Named Pipe Metadata
Mitigations (1)
- M1040 Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process.
Groups (10)
- G0010 Turla
- G0024 Putter Panda
- G0032 Lazarus Group
- G0065 Leviathan
- G0081 Tropic Trooper
- G0092 TA505
- G0094 Kimsuky
- G0102 Wizard Spider
- G0135 BackdoorDiplomacy
- G1026 Malteiro
Software (56)
- S0011 Taidoor
- S0012 PoisonIvy
- S0018 Sykipot
- S0021 Derusbi
- S0022 Uroburos
- S0024 Dyre
- S0038 Duqu
- S0055 RARSTONE
- S0081 Elise
- S0082 Emissary
- S0089 BlackEnergy
- S0125 Remsec
- S0126 ComRAT
- S0135 HIDEDRV
- S0154 Cobalt Strike
- S0167 Matryoshka
- S0182 FinFisher
- S0192 Pupy
- S0194 PowerSploit
- S0241 RATANKBA
- S0250 Koadic
- S0265 Kazuar
- S0273 Socksbot
- S0335 Carbon
- S0367 Emotet
- S0412 ZxShell
- S0449 Maze
- S0455 Metamorfo
- S0456 Aria-body
- S0457 Netwalker
- S0458 Ramsay
- S0460 Get2
- S0461 SDBbot
- S0467 TajMahal
- S0484 Carberp
- S0501 PipeMon
- S0575 Conti
- S0576 MegaCortex
- S0581 IronNetInjector
- S0596 ShadowPad
- S0603 Stuxnet
- S0613 PS1
- S0615 SombRAT
- S0666 Gelsemium
- S0681 Lizar
- S1018 Saint Bot
- S1026 Mongall
- S1027 Heyoka Backdoor
- S1039 Bumblebee
- S1044 FunnyDream
- S1066 DarkTortilla
- S1081 BADHATCH
- S1210 Sagerunex
- S1229 Havoc
- S1239 TONESHELL
- S1242 Qilin
