Indicator Removal
- ID
- T1070
- Tactics
- TA0005 Stealth
- Platforms
- Containers, ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
- Data sources
- File Deletion, Application Log Content, Windows Registry Key Modification, File Modification, File Metadata, Scheduled Job Modification
- Source
- attack.mitre.org
- MITRE last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior.
Artifacts such as command histories, log entries, or file metadata may be altered in ways that align with expected user or system activity. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often platform-specific, allowing adversaries to tailor modifications that minimize suspicion.
These actions may not prevent detection entirely but can delay recognition of malicious activity or reduce the fidelity of alerts by making events appear benign or consistent with routine operations. Additionally, selectively removed or modified artifacts may still be recoverable through deeper forensic analysis, though their absence or alteration can complicate timeline reconstruction and attribution.
Sub-techniques (8)
- T1070.003 Clear Command History
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal
- T1070.006 Timestomp
- T1070.007 Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
- T1070.008 Clear Mailbox Data
- T1070.009 Clear Persistence
- T1070.010 Relocate Malware
Detection
- DET0184 Behavioral Detection of Indicator Removal Across Platforms
Data components: File Deletion, Application Log Content, Windows Registry Key Modification, File Modification, File Metadata, Scheduled Job Modification
Mitigations (3)
- M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities.
- M1029 Remote Data Storage
Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system.
- M1041 Encrypt Sensitive Information
Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.
Groups (4)
Software (27)
- S0089 BlackEnergy
- S0229 Orz
- S0239 Bankshot
- S0332 Remcos
- S0448 Rising Sun
- S0449 Maze
- S0455 Metamorfo
- S0461 SDBbot
- S0527 CSPY Downloader
- S0559 SUNBURST
- S0568 EVILNUM
- S0589 Sibot
- S0596 ShadowPad
- S0603 Stuxnet
- S0673 DarkWatchman
- S0691 Neoichor
- S0692 SILENTTRINITY
- S0695 Donut
- S0696 Flagpro
- S0697 HermeticWiper
- S1044 FunnyDream
- S1085 Sardonic
- S1132 IPsec Helper
- S1135 MultiLayer Wiper
- S1159 DUSTTRAP
- S1161 BPFDoor
- S9029 IronWind
