Proxy: Internal Proxy
- ID
- T1090.001
- Tactics
- TA0011 Command and Control
- Sub-technique of
- T1090 Proxy
- Platforms
- ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- Data sources
- Network Connection Creation, Process Creation, Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic Content, Service Creation, Firewall Rule Modification, Command Execution
- Source
- attack.mitre.org
- MITRE last modified
- 9 Sep 2026
Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.[2] Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.
By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.
Detection
- DET0075 Internal Proxy Behavior via Lateral Host-to-Host C2 Relay
Data components: Network Connection Creation, Process Creation, Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic Content, Service Creation, Firewall Rule Modification, Command Execution
Mitigations (1)
- M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[1]
Groups (9)
- G0010 Turla
- G0030 Lotus Blossom
- G0032 Lazarus Group
- G0041 Strider
- G0087 APT39
- G0126 Higaisa
- G1016 FIN13
- G1017 Volt Typhoon
- G1047 Velvet Ant
Software (23)
- S0009 Hikit
- S0023 CHOPSTICK
- S0031 BACKSPACE
- S0038 Duqu
- S0051 MiniDuke
- S0141 Winnti for Windows
- S0154 Cobalt Strike
- S0260 InvisiMole
- S0265 Kazuar
- S0502 Drovorub
- S0512 FatDuke
- S0556 Pay2Key
- S0603 Stuxnet
- S0633 Sliver
- S0699 Mythic
- S1059 metaMain
- S1060 Mafalda
- S1100 Ninja
- S1198 Gomir
- S1227 StarProxy
- S9010 GlassWorm
- S9015 BRICKSTORM
- S9023 HiddenFace
References
- University of Birmingham C2
- Trend Micro APT Attack Tools