Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
- ID
- T1090.003
- Tactics
- TA0011 Command and Control
- Sub-technique of
- T1090 Proxy
- Platforms
- ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- Data sources
- Network Connection Creation, Process Creation, Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic Content, Firmware Modification
- Source
- attack.mitre.org
- MITRE last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available Tor network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.[1] Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations.[2]
In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., Network Devices). By leveraging Patch System Image on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the Network Boundary Bridging method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.
Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.[3]
Detection
- DET0359 Multi-hop Proxy Behavior via Relay Node Chaining, Onion Routing, and Network Tunneling
Data components: Network Connection Creation, Process Creation, Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic Content, Firmware Modification
Mitigations (1)
- M1037 Filter Network Traffic
Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting.
Groups (13)
- G0007 APT28
- G0016 APT29
- G0030 Lotus Blossom
- G0047 Gamaredon Group
- G0065 Leviathan
- G0085 FIN4
- G0100 Inception
- G0128 ZIRCONIUM
- G1003 Ember Bear
- G1017 Volt Typhoon
- G1045 Salt Typhoon
- G1051 Medusa Group
- G1057 ShinyHunters
Software (23)
- S0022 Uroburos
- S0183 Tor
- S0276 Keydnap
- S0281 Dok
- S0282 MacSpy
- S0342 GreyEnergy
- S0366 WannaCry
- S0384 Dridex
- S0386 Ursnif
- S0438 Attor
- S0491 StrongPity
- S0604 Industroyer
- S0623 Siloscape
- S0641 Kobalos
- S0687 Cyclops Blink
- S1087 AsyncRAT
- S1100 Ninja
- S1106 NGLite
- S1107 NKAbuse
- S1144 FRP
- S1184 BOLDMOVE
- S9001 SystemBC
- S9043 Mini Shai-Hulud
