External Remote Services
- ID
- T1133
- Tactics
- TA0001 Initial Access, TA0003 Persistence
- Platforms
- Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
- Data sources
- User Account Authentication, Application Log Content, Network Connection Creation, Logon Session Metadata, Network Traffic Flow
- Source
- attack.mitre.org
- MITRE last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.[2]
Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.[3] Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.[4][5]
Adversaries may also establish persistence on network by configuring a Tor hidden service on a compromised system. Adversaries may utilize the tool ShadowLink to facilitate the installation and configuration of the Tor hidden service. Tor hidden service is then accessible via the Tor network because ShadowLink sets up a .onion address on the compromised system. ShadowLink may be used to forward any inbound connections to RDP, allowing the adversaries to have remote access.[6] Adversaries may get ShadowLink to persist on a system by masquerading it as an MS Defender application.[7]
Detection
- DET0354 Behavior-chain detection for T1133 External Remote Services across Windows, Linux, macOS, Containers
Data components: User Account Authentication, Application Log Content, Network Connection Creation, Logon Session Metadata, Network Traffic Flow
Mitigations (5)
- M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content
Restrict all traffic to and from public Tor nodes. [1]
- M1030 Network Segmentation
Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls.
- M1032 Multi-factor Authentication
Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of Multi-Factor Authentication Interception techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.
- M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems.
- M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable or block remotely available services that may be unnecessary.
Groups (28)
- G0004 Ke3chang
- G0007 APT28
- G0016 APT29
- G0026 APT18
- G0027 Threat Group-3390
- G0034 Sandworm Team
- G0035 Dragonfly
- G0049 OilRig
- G0053 FIN5
- G0065 Leviathan
- G0093 GALLIUM
- G0094 Kimsuky
- G0096 APT41
- G0099 APT-C-36
- G0102 Wizard Spider
- G0114 Chimera
- G0115 GOLD SOUTHFIELD
- G0139 TeamTNT
- G1003 Ember Bear
- G1004 LAPSUS$
- G1015 Scattered Spider
- G1016 FIN13
- G1017 Volt Typhoon
- G1024 Akira
- G1040 Play
- G1041 Sea Turtle
- G1047 Velvet Ant
- G1055 VOID MANTICORE
Software (5)
References
- Defending Against Malicious Cyber Activity Originating from Tor
- MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop
- Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
- Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server
- Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
- The BadPilot campaign
- Russian threat actors dig in, prepare to seize on war fatigue
