CyberStack

MITRE ATT&CK / Techniques / T1490

Inhibit System Recovery

ID
T1490
Tactics
TA0040 Impact
Platforms
Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
Data sources
Process Creation, File Deletion, Service Metadata, Windows Registry Key Modification, Command Execution, Snapshot Deletion, Cloud Storage Deletion
Source
attack.mitre.org
MITRE last modified
12 May 2026

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.[5][6] This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of Data Destruction and Data Encrypted for Impact.[5][6] Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.[7]

A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:

  • vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
  • Windows Management Instrumentation can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete
  • wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet
  • bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no
  • REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system
  • diskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows all [8] [9]

On network devices, adversaries may leverage Disk Wipe to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then System Shutdown/Reboot to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.

On ESXi servers, adversaries may delete or encrypt snapshots of virtual machines to support Data Encrypted for Impact, preventing them from being leveraged as backups (e.g., via vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall).[10]

Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.[11] In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.[12][13]

Detection

Mitigations (4)

M1018 User Account Management

Limit the user accounts that have access to backups to only those required. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control Policies to restrict API calls to delete backups, snapshots, and images.

M1028 Operating System Configuration

Consider technical controls to prevent the disabling of services or deletion of files involved in system recovery. Additionally, ensure that WinRE is enabled using the following command: reagentc /enable.[1]

M1038 Execution Prevention

Consider using application control configured to block execution of utilities such as diskshadow.exe that may not be required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.

M1053 Data Backup

Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[2] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery. In cloud environments, enable versioning on storage objects where possible, and copy backups to other accounts or regions to isolate them from the original copies.[3] On ESXi servers, ensure that disk images and snapshots of virtual machines are regularly taken, with copies stored off system.[4]

Groups (7)

Software (49)

References

  1. reagentc_cmd
  2. Ready.gov IT DRP
  3. Unit 42 Palo Alto Ransomware in Public Clouds 2022
  4. Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021
  5. Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
  6. FireEye WannaCry 2017
  7. disable_notif_synology_ransom
  8. Diskshadow
  9. Crytox Ransomware
  10. Cybereason
  11. ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020
  12. Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack
  13. Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware