MITRE ATT&CK / Techniques / T1546.006

Event Triggered Execution: LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition

ID
T1546.006
Tactics
TA0003 Persistence, TA0004 Privilege Escalation
Sub-technique of
T1546 Event Triggered Execution
Platforms
macOS
Data sources
Module Load, File Modification, File Metadata
Source
attack.mitre.org
MITRE last modified
25 Oct 2025

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.[1] There are tools available to perform these changes.

Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.[2]

Detection

Mitigations (3)

M1038 Execution Prevention

Allow applications via known hashes.

M1045 Code Signing

Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs.

M1047 Audit

Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn't included as part of an update, it should be investigated.

References

  1. Writing Bad Malware for OSX
  2. Malware Persistence on OS X