Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket
- ID
- T1558.001
- Tactics
- TA0006 Credential Access
- Sub-technique of
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- Platforms
- Windows
- Data sources
- Logon Session Metadata, Active Directory Credential Request, Process Access
- Source
- attack.mitre.org
- MITRE last modified
- 25 Oct 2025
Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.[2] Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.[3]
Using a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.[4]
The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.[5] The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using OS Credential Dumping and privileged access to a domain controller.
Detection
- DET0144 Detect Forged Kerberos Golden Tickets (T1558.001)
Data components: Logon Session Metadata, Active Directory Credential Request, Process Access
Mitigations (2)
- M1015 Active Directory Configuration
For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. For each domain, change the KRBTGT account password once, force replication, and then change the password a second time. Consider rotating the KRBTGT account password every 180 days.[1]
- M1026 Privileged Account Management
Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.