Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- ID
- T1583.001
- Tactics
- TA0042 Resource Development
- Sub-technique of
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- Platforms
- PRE
- Data sources
- Passive DNS, Domain Registration, Active DNS
- Source
- attack.mitre.org
- MITRE last modified
- 18 Sep 2026
Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.
Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for Phishing, Drive-by Compromise, and Command and Control.[1] Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).[2][3] Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via Drive-by Compromise. Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.[4][5][6][7][8]
Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).[9][10][11][12]
Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.[13][14][15][16]
Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.[17]
In addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hosted zones pointing to resources of the threat actor’s choosing.[18]
Detection
- DET0892 Detection of Domains
Data components: Passive DNS, Domain Registration, Active DNS
Mitigations (1)
- M1056 Pre-compromise
Organizations may intentionally register similar domains to their own to deter adversaries from creating typosquatting domains. Other facets of this technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.
Groups (48)
- G0006 APT1
- G0007 APT28
- G0027 Threat Group-3390
- G0032 Lazarus Group
- G0034 Sandworm Team
- G0035 Dragonfly
- G0044 Winnti Group
- G0045 menuPass
- G0046 FIN7
- G0047 Gamaredon Group
- G0049 OilRig
- G0050 APT32
- G0059 Magic Hound
- G0065 Leviathan
- G0069 MuddyWater
- G0082 APT38
- G0090 WIRTE
- G0092 TA505
- G0094 Kimsuky
- G0099 APT-C-36
- G0122 Silent Librarian
- G0128 ZIRCONIUM
- G0129 Mustang Panda
- G0134 Transparent Tribe
- G0136 IndigoZebra
- G0137 Ferocious Kitten
- G0139 TeamTNT
- G0140 LazyScripter
- G1001 HEXANE
- G1002 BITTER
- G1006 Earth Lusca
- G1011 EXOTIC LILY
- G1012 CURIUM
- G1015 Scattered Spider
- G1018 TA2541
- G1033 Star Blizzard
- G1035 Winter Vivern
- G1036 Moonstone Sleet
- G1041 Sea Turtle
- G1042 RedEcho
- G1044 APT42
- G1046 Storm-1811
- G1052 Contagious Interview
- G1055 VOID MANTICORE
- G1056 TeamPCP
- G1057 ShinyHunters
- G1058 The Gentlemen
- G1059 NIMBUS MANTICORE
