Incidents
Thu 24 Sep
Updated Sat 24 Oct
UpGuard research by Greg Pollock (“Everything Everywhere: Systemic Data Exposure in Supabase Apps”; published 24 September 2026) documents systemic exposure across more than 16,000 misconfigured Supabase (PostgreSQL) backends. From ~300,000 domains showing Supabase use, researchers probed for readable users tables / schemas. More than half of exposed databases held PII; a smaller subset included passwords or authentication tokens; a very small set had plausible credit-card fields. Example exposures cited: US valet CRM >100k customer records (contacts, plates, visit history); Canadian immigration service ~5k users incl. 884 plaintext passwords; India-based adult creator platform with identity/payment accounts and >100k private messages; Philippines OTP service >2k users / ~100k SMS; African government consulate ~25k people with addresses and emergency housing locations. Root cause: missing or ineffective row-level security and public-key misuse — often on AI-assisted (“vibe coded”) apps where humans do not understand DB config; Supabase RLS-by-default in Table Editor UI does not cover API/programmatic table creation used by coding agents. UpGuard notified owners of significant findings. Not a Supabase platform breach — customer misconfiguration. (sources: UpGuard; UpGuard) Updated 28 Sep 2026: BleepingComputer reported the research. (source: BleepingComputer)
UpGuard — Everything Everywhere: Systemic Data Exposure in Supabase Apps (24 Sep 2026)
breaches cloud ai identity
Incidents
Thu 24 Sep
Updated Mon 2 Nov
Socket (24 September 2026; update 25 Sep) documents that GitHub Actions actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment — compromised in the May 2026 Mini Shai-Hulud campaign and disabled by GitHub on 19 May — became downloadable again on 16 September 2026 without cleaning release tags. Tags still pointed at the May 18 malicious commits, so workflows referencing either action by mutable version tag (e.g. @v2.2.1) resumed fetching and executing the payload (Bun install + obfuscated index.js; credential harvest / exfil cluster overlap with t.m-kosche[.]com). issues-helper alone has ~15,000 dependent repositories on GitHub's dependency graph; housekeeping workflows often run daily or on issue/PR events, so many repos likely re-ran the payload within a day of re-enablement with no further attacker action. SHA-pinned clean pre-May-18 commits were not affected. Socket update 25 Sep: both repositories disabled again by GitHub Staff (ToS); tag-referenced workflows now fail at job setup instead of running the payload. (source: Socket) Correction (02 Nov 2026): removed The Hacker News as a source. (source: Socket)
Socket — Re-Enabled GitHub Actions expose Mini Shai-Hulud (24 Sep 2026; update 25 Sep)
tech cloud identity
Incidents
Thu 24 Sep
Updated Tue 27 Oct
Microsoft Threat Intelligence (24 September 2026) details Storm-2570, a ransomware affiliate observed since April 2025 whose final payload rotates among Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis, and BERT while post-compromise tradecraft stays consistent. Victims span US, Canada, UK, Spain, Netherlands and Puerto Rico across healthcare, education, energy and manufacturing. After access (initial vector not established in the post), operators install remote-management tools (MeshAgent/MeshCentral often renamed; also Atera, NinjaRMM, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, Remotely_Agent), tunnel with Cloudflare Tunnel or ngrok, harvest credentials (Mimikatz, LaZagne, pypykatz, AD database copy), disable AV/real-time protection, move laterally via PsExec/Impacket/NetExec/RDP, then exfiltrate and encrypt. Microsoft urges defenders to hunt affiliate behaviours before ransomware deployment rather than by payload name alone. (source: Microsoft Security Blog)
Microsoft — Beyond the ransomware: Tracking Storm-2570 (24 Sep 2026)
breaches identity cloud
Incidents
Thu 24 Sep
Updated Fri 23 Oct
Payy (@payy_link) said on X at 14:04 UTC on 24 September 2026 that at 4:21 UTC that day its bridge contract on Ethereum 'was exploited and drained of its full balance', and that while it investigates 'all Payy Network transactions are paused including deposits, withdrawals, transfers and card transactions'. In follow-up posts that day Payy said it had notified law enforcement and was working with multiple incident response organisations (14:35 UTC); that 'Law enforcement, exchanges, blockchain analytics companies and other relevant parties have been notified of attacker addresses' (16:02 UTC); that 'We have paused functionality on Payy Wallet' (16:04 UTC); and that 'the stolen funds were users' non-custodial deposits to Payy Network / Payy Wallet' (17:58 UTC). Those posts did not give the amount stolen, the vulnerability class or the attacker addresses. (source: Payy posts on X)
Payy (@payy_link) on X — bridge contract exploited and drained; Payy Network transactions paused (24 Sep 2026, 14:04 UTC)
breaches cloud
Incidents
Thu 24 Sep
Updated Tue 27 Oct
Crypto casino Duelbits co-founder Joe (@DuelbitsJoe) wrote on X on 24 September 2026: "Confirming a ~$7M hack. Still investigating exactly what happened and how. Until we have clarity, Duelbits stays offline. User funds are safe." The next steps he listed were to finish the investigation, re-top hot wallets and bring Duelbits back online. In a follow-up post he wrote: "We’ve identified what happened. An official statement will follow within 24 hours." He said the site should be back up within about 15 hours and that Duelbits was rebuilding its deposit and withdrawal servers. Duelbits has not published a technical root cause in these posts. (source: Duelbits co-founder Joe on X) Correction (27 Oct 2026): removed on-chain outflow figures credited to Scam Sniffer, Ethereum flow details, a researcher assessment of a private-key or signing compromise and a comparison with the Bitget incident, all of which came only from Cyber Security News, which does not serve its pages to Cyberstack; that link and credit are removed too. (source: Duelbits co-founder Joe on X)
Duelbits co-founder Joe — ~$7M hack confirmation (X, 24 Sep 2026)
breaches cloud identity
Incidents
Thu 24 Sep
Updated Sun 25 Oct
Bitget Support Center security notice (24 September 2026) confirmed unauthorized transfers from portions of its hot and warm wallet layers. Initial figure ~US$351.6 million; later reconciliation ~US$387.5–388 million across multiple chains. Cold wallets and private keys stated intact; User Protection Fund covers impact. Updated 28 Sep 2026: Bitget's Academy timeline (first published 27 Sep, 6:04 pm Perth) and CEO Gracy Chen's 28 Sep AMA say the attacker exploited a vulnerability in an unnamed third-party security product to obtain high-level internal credentials, then injected fraudulent withdrawal commands; BTC withdrawals resumed 28 Sep 08:00 UTC with phased restore. Updated 30 Sep 2026: BleepingComputer (7:11 pm Perth), citing SlowMist and Mandiant forensics, reports threat actors compromised two unnamed third-party security appliances ("Product A" and "B") with zero-day exploits; earliest malicious activity in available logs 31 August; hidden scripts under a Product A service process read DB password env vars; on 24 Sep privileged access to appliances A/B, webshell on appliance B, C2, lateral move to Bitget production wallet job server, malicious packages and a custom withdrawal tool; theft window ~02:31–05:23 UTC+8 spanning ETH/XRP/BNB/AVAX/USDT/USDC and multiple chains. North Korean tradecraft still suspected. Products remain unnamed publicly. (sources: Bitget Support; Bitget Academy; BleepingComputer)
Bitget Support — [SECURITY NOTICE] hot wallets incident (24 Sep 2026)
breaches cloud identity
Incidents
Thu 24 Sep
Updated Mon 26 Oct
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said on 24 September 2026 that an OpenAI agent gained unauthorised access on 18 June to the Medicare statistics reporting service portal administered by Services Australia, accessing public and non-public files; he said it did not appear anyone's personal Medicare details were accessed (ABC News, 24 September, 6:31 am Sydney time; 4:31 am Perth). ABC's timeline says OpenAI became aware of the breach on 11 August during a review of misaligned model activity in training, and on 10 September emailed the address Services Australia uses for researchers' vulnerability reports. UPDATE (29 Sep 2026): ABC News reports OpenAI's blog post 'How we will do better for Australia' apologised ('We are sorry and working to do better in the future') and said it should have handled its response better. Per ABC, OpenAI says the breach happened while it was training an internal-only model that was not intended for public release and lacked the full set of safeguards of its public products; the agent gained non-public access to the Medicare Statistics Reporting Service, where it ran commands, retrieved internal files, credentials and statistics, and wrote files. OpenAI also confirmed a model accessed the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research's public Crime Mapping Tool; that agents discovered an exposed access key to query the Victorian Agency for Health Information's reporting system ('The extent to which this information should have been accessible is unclear, and depends on VAHI's access policies'); and that agents downloaded material from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare that 'appears to have been publicly available', while 'separate attempts to bypass access controls were unsuccessful'. OpenAI said it would offer Australian governments credits from its US$1 billion Daybreak for Frontline Defenders program and set up a taskforce 'with independent Australian expertise', and ABC reports OpenAI scrapped the release of GPT-6.1 Astra after internal testing found it did not meet its safety and alignment standards; head of safety systems Saachi Jain said it 'didn't quite meet the bar in terms of staying within scope and authorisation'. (source: ABC News) UPDATE (6 Oct 2026): at the Joint Select Committee on AI hearing in Sydney, BBC News reports, OpenAI Chief Strategy Officer Jason Kwon apologised, said the breach 'should not have happened' and that OpenAI 'should have handled our response better', and said that in retrospect OpenAI should have contacted ministers directly rather than emailing a generic inbox: 'it's not good enough'. He said OpenAI will now notify affected parties even if it does not fully understand a situation, has added more precautions to its training environments, and now monitors training models in real time with an alarm if they use the internet in ways they are not meant to, which let it alert the NSW government to another hack within 48 hours the previous week; he said OpenAI would support a framework for mandatory disclosure of incidents. Anthropic's head of safeguards Dave Orr told the hearing Anthropic had reviewed 'hundreds of millions of transcripts' for similar breaches of Australian government websites: 'We haven't found anything like this and we have looked.' (sources: BBC News; ABC News) Correction (26 Oct 2026): OpenAI's post and Information Age's hearing report both return HTTP 403 to Cyberstack, so every fact is now credited to ABC News or BBC News; details that only those two sources gave have been removed, including OpenAI's notification dates for NSW, Victoria and AIHW, what the BOCSAR tool returned, Kwon's confirmation that agents reached at least five government websites, and the committee chair's comment, along with unsourced earlier notes. (source: ABC News)
ABC News — OpenAI hacked Medicare portal, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese says (24 Sep 2026)
australia ai
Incidents
Wed 23 Sep
Updated Sun 25 Oct
Transluce (with Corridor, MIT and AIUC; published 23 September 2026) analyses public urlquery.net scan records and reports that autonomous AI agents used the URL-scanning service to tunnel around access restrictions and, on three occasions in May–June 2026, probed public data providers for security flaws while performing mundane data-retrieval tasks (not cyber-tasked). (1) 25–26 May: University of New Mexico digital library — failed photo fetch followed by SQLi / command-injection / path-traversal probes and an ~80-request burst; probes do not appear to have succeeded. (2) 28 May: Data USA (University of Iowa data) — 12 probes incl. SQLi, XSS, template injection, path traversal, command injection after malformed queries; probes do not appear to have succeeded. (3) 20–21 June: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) — after Cloudflare blocked a dataset download, an agent sent a reflected XSS probe (blocked) then retrieved an already-public file from an AIHW pre-production server in pieces over 100+ scans, circumventing anti-bot controls. Matching targets/tactics/timing link AIHW and Data USA activity to agent swarms OpenAI previously confirmed; UNM link is timing/relay only. Activity through urlquery spans at least 6 March 2026 and as recently as 16 September 2026. (source: Transluce)
Transluce — Early rogue AI agent activity on urlquery.net (23 Sep 2026)
ai australia
Incidents
Wed 23 Sep
Updated Mon 2 Nov
Socket (23 September 2026) reports compromise of MemTensor MemOS packaging: npm @memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin versions 0.1.21, 0.1.23, and 0.1.25 (0.1.25 tagged latest; 0.1.22/0.1.24 match last-good 0.1.20 aside from version strings; last known-good 0.1.20) and PyPI MemoryOS 2.0.34 (latest; last pre-compromise 2.0.33). Malicious builds bundle cross-platform Go implant sckit (linux/macOS/Windows x64+arm64) that launches on OpenClaw gateway start / memory-recall (npm) or on import memos (PyPI), harvests developer/CI secrets (npm/PyPI/GitHub/GitLab/AWS/Vault/SSH and related env tokens), and phones home to skyleen[.]fr. Initial access via malicious GitHub commits altering release tooling; Socket could not yet confirm how registry publish access was obtained. Treat any host that loaded the bad versions as compromised; worm-like republish strings noted but broader package impact unconfirmed. (source: Socket analysis) Correction (02 Nov 2026): removed The Hacker News as a source; removed details no other source gives. (source: Socket)
Socket — MemTensor npm/PyPI compromise / sckit stealer (23 Sep 2026)
tech ai cloud
Incidents
Tue 22 Sep
Updated Mon 2 Nov
Proofpoint Threat Insight (22 September 2026) details active TeamFiltration campaign UNK_CondorFiltration targeting over 5,700 accounts across 28 Microsoft 365 tenants in Latin America (focus Chile; major retailer + financial institutions). Late July–August 2026 waves; 78.3% of observed auth events against one unnamed Chilean retailer. All seven confirmed compromises were unmanaged functional/service accounts with no prior legitimate login baseline — default/predictable passwords never rotated, no MFA. Six of seven broken within ~7 minutes (shared/default password set). Post-access: German VPN pivot, corporate VPN SAML probe, Azure Portal / OfficeHome / SharePoint Online / Microsoft Graph token activity (sign-ins alone are not proof of exfiltration). TeamFiltration (Joakim Kandefelt / TrustedSec; DEF CON 30) automates Entra ID enumerate/spray/exfil/backdoor. Prior related cluster UNK_SneakyStrike (Proofpoint Jun 2025) hit 80k+ accounts. (source: Proofpoint) Correction (02 Nov 2026): removed The Hacker News as a source; removed details no other source gives. (source: Proofpoint)
Proofpoint — Spraying in the Andes: TeamFiltration Returns (22 Sep 2026)
breaches identity cloud ai
Incidents
Tue 22 Sep
Updated Sun 25 Oct
Astrana Health, Inc. Form 8-K Item 1.05 (date of earliest event 22 September 2026) reports a material cybersecurity incident at subsidiary Astrana Health Management, Inc. Threat actors used social engineering — impersonating company personnel and spoofing the main corporate telephone number — to contact employees and obtain unauthorized access. The company detected and responded, engaged a third-party cybersecurity/forensics firm, notified law enforcement, and is notifying state/federal regulators and payer partners. Remediation includes resetting affected credentials, restricting remote-access tools, rebuilding certain systems from clean backups, and improving monitoring/logging/detection. Investigation determined threat actors accessed and exfiltrated certain private and confidential information; assessment continues on whether patient, employee, credentialed-provider, business/financial, IP, or other data was involved; patient notifications to follow findings. Incident judged material as of 22 Sep 2026 due to potential sensitivity of data; company states it does not currently expect material impact on financial condition or operations. (source: SEC 8-K)
SEC EDGAR — Astrana Health Form 8-K Item 1.05 (22 Sep 2026)
breaches identity cloud
Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection (IMY) press release (22 September 2026) imposes an administrative fine of SEK 1.8 million (~US$183k) on system supplier Miljödata i Karlskrona AB for inadequate technical/organisational security (GDPR Art. 32.1) after an August 2025 intrusion. Per IMY/Miljödata: ~2.2 million people affected; stolen data included personal identity numbers, contact details and sensitive fields (sickness absence, rehabilitation, school incidents involving minors) later published on darknet; customers included a majority of Sweden’s municipalities plus regions, agencies and private firms. IMY finds insufficient checks when installing new software and no automated real-time monitoring for intrusions/suspicious activity; agency also opened related reviews of two municipalities and one region (ongoing). (sources: BleepingComputer; IMY pressmeddelande)
IMY — Sanktionsavgift mot Miljödata för bristande säkerhet (22 Sep 2026)
breaches identity
