System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32
- ID
- T1218.010
- Tactics
- TA0005 Stealth
- Sub-technique of
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- Platforms
- Windows
- Data sources
- Process Creation, Module Load, Network Connection Creation
- Source
- attack.mitre.org
- MITRE last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. [8]
Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. [9] This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. [10] [11]
Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking. [10]
Detection
- DET0282 Detection Strategy for System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32
Data components: Process Creation, Module Load, Network Connection Creation
Mitigations (1)
- M1050 Exploit Protection
Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass application control. [1] Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through regsvr32 functionality by using application control [2] tools, like Windows Defender Application Control[3], AppLocker, [4] [5] or Software Restriction Policies [6] where appropriate. [7]
Groups (11)
- G0009 Deep Panda
- G0050 APT32
- G0065 Leviathan
- G0073 APT19
- G0080 Cobalt Group
- G0090 WIRTE
- G0094 Kimsuky
- G0100 Inception
- G0108 Blue Mockingbird
- G0127 TA551
- G1053 Storm-0501
Software (23)
- S0021 Derusbi
- S0087 Hi-Zor
- S0229 Orz
- S0250 Koadic
- S0270 RogueRobin
- S0284 More_eggs
- S0341 Xbash
- S0367 Emotet
- S0373 Astaroth
- S0384 Dridex
- S0476 Valak
- S0481 Ragnar Locker
- S0554 Egregor
- S0568 EVILNUM
- S0622 AppleSeed
- S0650 QakBot
- S0698 HermeticWizard
- S1018 Saint Bot
- S1030 Squirrelwaffle
- S1047 Mori
- S1130 Raspberry Robin
- S1155 Covenant
- S1239 TONESHELL
References
- Secure Host Baseline EMET
- Beechey 2010
- Microsoft Windows Defender Application Control
- Windows Commands JPCERT
- NSA MS AppLocker
- Corio 2008
- TechNet Applocker vs SRP
- Microsoft Regsvr32
- LOLBAS Regsvr32
- Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016
- FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov
