Debugger Evasion
- ID
- T1622
- Tactics
- TA0005 Stealth, TA0007 Discovery
- Platforms
- Linux, macOS, Windows
- Data sources
- Process Creation, OS API Execution, File Access
- Source
- attack.mitre.org
- MITRE last modified
- 12 Sep 2026
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.[1]
Debugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.
Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary. On Windows, this may involve Native API function calls such as IsDebuggerPresent() and NtQueryInformationProcess(), or manually checking the BeingDebugged flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). On Linux, this may involve querying /proc/self/status for the TracerPID field, which indicates whether or not the process is being traced by dynamic analysis tools.[2][3] Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).[4][5][6]
Malware may also leverage Structured Exception Handling (SEH) to detect debuggers by throwing an exception and detecting whether the process is suspended. SEH handles both hardware and software expectations, providing control over the exceptions including support for debugging. If a debugger is present, the program’s control will be transferred to the debugger, and the execution of the code will be suspended. If the debugger is not present, control will be transferred to the SEH handler, which will automatically handle the exception and allow the program’s execution to continue.[7]
Adversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping Native API function calls such as OutputDebugStringW().[8][9]
Detection
- DET0371 Detection Strategy for Debugger Evasion (T1622)
Data components: Process Creation, OS API Execution, File Access
Groups (1)
Software (25)
- S0013 PlugX
- S0240 ROKRAT
- S0595 ThiefQuest
- S0694 DRATzarus
- S1018 Saint Bot
- S1039 Bumblebee
- S1060 Mafalda
- S1066 DarkTortilla
- S1070 Black Basta
- S1087 AsyncRAT
- S1111 DarkGate
- S1130 Raspberry Robin
- S1145 Pikabot
- S1160 Latrodectus
- S1183 StrelaStealer
- S1200 StealBit
- S1202 LockBit 3.0
- S1207 XLoader
- S1213 Lumma Stealer
- S1228 PUBLOAD
- S1239 TONESHELL
- S9019 PureCrypter
- S9027 ANELLDR
- S9037 RustyWater
- S9050 Vidar
