research
Published 2026-11-11
Verified 2026-11-13

CloudSEK: an exposed Silent Lynx server shows the operator used a self-hosted AI agent running on DeepSeek models for reconnaissance, collection and log cleanup, with destructive commands pre-approved

CloudSEK's threat research team published research on 11 November 2026 on an exposed open directory that it assesses with high confidence belongs to a Silent Lynx operator, a Central Asia-focused espionage cluster; CloudSEK assesses with medium confidence that the operator has a Kazakhstan nexus, because the operation runs in Russian and the operator's own test traffic came from a residential Kazakh connection.

CloudSEK says the directory held a timestamped record of tooling, intrusions and AI agent conversations from April to October 2026.

It says the operator had domain-level access to Tajikistan's national railway network from mid-August to at least 10 October 2026, used a single compromised employee account to collect government correspondence at scale, including defence-related documents, and intruded into Uzbekistan's Smart Forestry platform.

CloudSEK says the operator ran much of the work through Hermes, an open-source autonomous agent framework, with model calls routed through OpenRouter and DeepSeek models handling most of the logged traffic; the agent handled reconnaissance, collection and log cleanup with destructive commands pre-approved, and the operator tasked it through a Telegram bot.

CloudSEK also says lures impersonating Turkmenistan Railways and a Turkmen regional administration were built and tested in October 2026.

Product
Silent Lynx espionage operation using the Hermes open-source AI agent framework
Versions
n/a — threat research
Exploited in Australia?
unknown

ai